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1    Introduction 
 
 
The  transport  of commodities  can be conducted  via air, road or rail  routes  (in 
case of freight) or through pipelines (in case of gas or oil), or transmission lines 
(in case of electricity).  The passage of the commodity through these conduits is 
typically represented in economic models using a flow network [37].  These have 
nodes representing junctions and arcs representing transport routes. The flow 
through each arc is limited by its transport capacity. 
Transport constraints limit trade,  which makes production and consumption 
less efficient.  Moreover, transport constraints reduce competition between agents 
situated in separated markets, which worsens market efficiency even further.  Con- 
gestion is of particular importance for markets with negligible storage possibilities, 
such as wholesale electricity markets.  Then demand and supply must be instantly 
balanced and temporary congestion in the network can result in large local price 
spikes.   The  same market  can at  times  exhibit  very  little  market  power and, at 
other times, suffer from the exercise of a great deal of market power.  Borenstein 
et al.  [13] show that standard concentration measures such as the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman index (HHI) work poorly to assess the degree of competition in such 
markets.   Thus  competition  authorities  who need  to  predict  the  use  of market 
power under various counterfactuals - what might happen if a merger or acquisi- 
tion is accepted or transport capacity is expanded, need more detailed analytical 
tools. 
We analyze the influence a network's topology and transport constraints have 
on competition in an oligopoly market with a homogeneous commodity.  Producers 
and consumers are located in nodes of the network, which are connected by arcs 
(lines).  Transports in an arc are costless up to its transport capacity.  We focus on 
connected  radial  networks, where there is a unique path (chain of arcs) between 
every two nodes in the network.  We say that two nodes are completely integrated 
when they are connected via uncongested arcs.  A node is always completely 
integrated with itself. 
We assume that the commodity is traded in a network where each node has a 
local market price.  Consumers are price-takers and production costs are common 
knowledge.  We consider a simultaneous-move game, where each strategic producer 
first commits to a supply function, as in a multi-unit auction, and then a local ex- 
ogenous additive demand shock is realized in each node of the network.  After the 
demand  shocks have been realized, the commodity is transported along arcs be- 
tween the nodes by price-taking arbitrageurs or a regulated, price-taking network 
operator, who buy the commodity in one node and sell it in another node.  The 
market  is  cleared  when all feasible  arbitrage  opportunities  have been exhausted 
by the transport sector.  We solve for a Nash equilibrium of supply functions, also 
called a Supply Function Equilibrium  (SFE). 
The slope of the residual demand curve1  is important in the calculation of a 
producer's optimal offer.  Even if competitors play pure-strategies, the slope of the 
 
1 The residual demand at a specific price is given by demand at that  price less competitors' 
sales as that price. 
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residual demand curve is uncertain in equilibrium due to the local demand shocks. 
We characterize this uncertainty using Anderson and Philpott's [4] market distri- 
bution function approach, which is analogous to Wilson's probability distribution 
of the market price [46]. For radial networks, we show that the optimal output of 
a producer is proportional to its mark-up and the expected slope of the residual 
demand curve that it is facing.2 In the paper we use graph theory to show how the 
expected slope of the residual demand curve relates to the characteristics of the 
network and competitors' supply functions.  For a given vector of demand shocks, 
the flow through arcs with a strictly binding transport capacity is fixed on the 
margin. Thus on the margin, a firm's realized residual demand is only influenced 
by production and consumption in nodes that are completely integrated with the 
firm's node.  Due to the arbitrageurs in the transport sector, two nodes that are 
completely integrated will have the same market price.  We define a market inte- 
gration  function  for each producer,  which equals  the  expected  number  of nodes 
that the producer's node is completely integrated with (including its own node) 
conditional on the producer's output and its local market price. 
In principle, a system of our optimality conditions can be used to numerically 
solve  for Supply  Function  Equilibria  in general  networks.   In our paper we use 
them to solve for symmetric equilibria in two-node and star networks with in- 
elastic demand.3    Firms' supply functions depend on the number of firms in the 
market and generally network flows depend on firms' supply functions.  Still it can 
be shown that in a symmetric equilibrium with inelastic demand, market integra- 
tion can be determined from the following parameters   the network topology, the 
demand shock distribution, transport capacities and nodal production capacities. 
In this  case equilibrium  flows  do not  depend on the  number  of firms.   The  im- 
plication is that oligopoly producers will have high mark-ups at output levels for 
which the market integration function, which can be calculated for a competitive 
market, returns small values, and lower mark-ups at output levels where market 
integration is expected to be high. 
In the special case of multi-dimensional uniformly distributed demand shocks, 
the market integration function simplifies to a constant for symmetric equilibria. 
We show that a producer's equilibrium supply function in a node of such a net- 
work is identical to an equilibrium supply function in an isolated node where the 
number of symmetric firms have been scaled by the market integration function. 
Thus previous analytical results for symmetric SFE in single node networks and 
properties  of such SFE  [5][21][25][29][38] can be generalized  to  symmetric  SFE 
in symmetric radial networks with transport constraints and multi-dimensional 
uniformly distributed demand shocks. 
We focus on characterising supply function equilibrium (SFE) in radial net- 
works.  However, we also show how our optimality conditions can be generalized to 
consider meshed  networks, which have multiple paths (loop flows ) between some 
 
2 Note that  the output  of the firm  influences  congestion  in the network, which in its turn 
influences its residual demand curve. Thus with  the slope of a firm's residual demand we here 
mean the slope of its residual demand conditional on that it has a fixed output. 
3 There are no strategic producers in the center node of the star network. Thus the network 
is symmetric from the producers' perspective. 
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nodes in the  network.   Although  the  meshed model  does not  simplify  as in the 
radial case.  Moreover, we describe how our conditions can be modified to calcu- 
late SFE in networks with a discriminatory multi-unit auction (pay-as-bid pricing) 
in the nodes and Cournot Nash equilibrium in networks with uncertain demand. 
Normally nodes represent the geographical location of a market place,  and with 
transport  we normally mean that  the  commodity  is  moved from one geographi- 
cal location to another location.  But nodes and transports could be interpreted 
in a more general  sense.   For example,  a node could represent  a point  in time 
or a geographical  location at a particular point in time.  Moreover,  storage at a 
geographical location can be represented by arcs that allow for transports of the 
commodity to the same location, but at a later point in time.  The transport 
capacity of such arcs would then correspond to the local storage capacity. 
The supply function equilibrium for a single node with marginal pricing was 
originally developed by Klemperer and Meyer [29]. This model represents a gen- 
eralized  form of competition  in  oligopoly markets,  in-between  the  extremes  of 
the  Bertrand  and Cournot  equilibrium.   The  setting  of the  SFE is  particularly 
well-suited for markets where producers submit supply functions to a uniform- 
price auction before demand has been realized, as in wholesale electricity markets 
[12][21][25].  This has also been confirmed qualitatively and quantitatively in sev- 
eral  empirical  studies  of bidding in electricity  markets.4    But  the  SFE model  is 
of more general interest.  Klemperer and Meyer [29] argue that although most 
markets are not explicitly cleared by uniform-price auctions, firms typically face 
a uniform market price and they need predetermined decision rules for lower-level 
managers to deal with changing market conditions.  Thus, in general, firms im- 
plicitly commit to supply functions.  Klemperer and Meyer's model has only one 
uncertain parameter, a demand shock. In equilibrium there is a one to one map- 
ping between the price and shock. Thus each firm can choose its supply function 
such that its output is optimal for every realized shock.  Klemperer and Meyer's 
equilibrium is therefore said to be ex-post  optimal.  As noted by Anderson et al [6], 
this feature is difficult to translate into a network with multi-dimensional demand 
shocks.5 
By requiring that each firm's offer is optimal only in expectation,  the recent 
paper by Wilson [45] takes a different approach, which enables him to extend 
Klemperer and Meyer's [29] model to consider the network's influence on bidding 
strategies.6    Wilson,  however, does not derive any second-order conditions in his 
 
4 Empirical studies of the electricity market in Texas (ERCOT) show that supply functions of 
the two to three largest firms in this market roughly match Klemperer and Meyer's first-order 
condition [27][40]. The fit is worse for small producers. According to Wolak [47] the reason 
is that  these studies did not consider that  supply  functions are stepped. He shows that  both 
large and small electricity producers in Australia choose stepped supply functions in order to 
maximize profits; at least observed data does not reject this hypothesis. 
5 Anderson et al [6] investigate a two-node transmission network with both independent and 
correlated demand at the nodes.  They derive formulae to represent the market distribution 
function for a producer when its network becomes interconnected  to a previously separate grid 
under the assumption that the interconnection does not change competitors' supply functions. 
6 Lin and Baldick [31] and Lin et al [32] also calculate first-order conditions for transmission 
networks with supply function offers, but their model is limited to cases with certain demand. 
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paper nor does he solve for SFE, so his analysis is missing some fundamental 
components that our analysis provides. 
Previous  research  has shown  that  second-order  conditions  are  often  violated 
in a network  with  strategic  producers.  The  reason  is  that  transport  constraints 
can introduce kinks (nonsmoothness) in a producer's residual demand curve which 
becomes discontinuously less price sensitive when net imports to its node are con- 
gested.  Thus, in a node where imports are nearly congested it will  be profitable 
for a producer to withhold production in order to push the price above the next 
breakpoint  in its  residual  demand curve.   This  type  of deviation  will  often  rule 
out pure-strategy Nash equilibria.7   Borenstein et al.  [14] for example rule out 
Cournot NE when the transport capacity between two symmetric markets is suf- 
ficiently small and demand is certain.  Downward et al.  [17] analyse existence of 
Cournot equilibria in general networks with transport constraints.8   We verify that 
monotonic solutions to our first-order conditions are Supply Function Equilibria 
(SFE) when the shock density is sufficiently evenly distributed, i.e.  close to a uni- 
form multi-dimensional distribution. In this case the demand shocks will smooth 
the residual demand curve, so that its breakpoints disappear in expectation.  But 
existence of SFE cannot be taken for granted.  Perfectly correlated demand shocks 
or steep slopes and discontinuities in the demand shock density will  not smooth 
the  residual  demand curve  sufficiently  well,  and then  profitable  deviations  from 
the first-order solution will exist.9 
Our paper also  differs  from Wilson  [45] in the  source  of randomness.   In his 
proofs, local demand is certain in all markets but one, and transmission capacities 
are uncertain.  Nevertheless, even if our calculations are less straightforward, espe- 
cially for meshed networks, we find it important to also analyze the multi-market 
case with local net-demand shocks/variations and known transmission capacities. 
We believe that our model is of particular relevance for markets with long-lived 
bids, such as PJM10 , where producers' offers are fixed during the whole day to meet 
a wide range of local demand outcomes.  Also large local net-demand shocks can 
occur on short notice, especially in electricity networks with significant amounts 
of wind power, so our model is also relevant for markets with short lived bids. 
Our model is mainly intended to represent competition in a transportation net- 
 
7 But Escobar and Jofre [18] show that there is normally a mixed-strategy NE in those cases. 
Adler et al.  [1] and Hu and Ralph [28] show that existence of pure-strategy Cournot NE de- 
pends on the assumptions made about the rationality  of the players. Hobbs et al [22] bypasses 
the existence issue by using conjectural variations instead of a Nash equilibrium. Existence of 
equilibria is more straightforward in networks with infinitesimally small producers [16][18][26]. 
8 Willems [44] analyse how a network operator's rule to allocate transmission capacity influ- 
ences the Cournot NE. Wei and Smeers [43] calculate Cournot NE in transmission networks with 
regulated transmission prices. Oren [36] calculates Cournot NE in a network with transmission 
rights. Neuhoff et al's [34] use Cournot NE to analyse competition in the northwestern European 
wholesale electricity market. 
9 Note that  a discontinuity in a node's shock density is acceptable as long as it occurs when 
transport capacities in all arcs to the node are binding. 
1 0 PJM is the largest existing deregulated wholesale electricity market. Originally  PJM coor- 
dinated the movement of wholesale electricity in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland.  Now 
PJM has expanded to also cover all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Virginia,  West Virginia and the District  of Columbia. 
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work with tangible objects, such as commodities.  However, it may also be useful 
as an oligopoly model of intangible items, such as securities, that are traded in a 
network of exchanges.  In this case, our production and transmission constraints 
would represent some sort of financial or purchase constraints that limits the num- 
ber of securities that buyers and arbitrageurs, respectively, can buy in exchanges.11 
In parallel to our paper, Malamud and Rostek (2013) develop a related model of 
decentralized exchanges.  A difference in their work is that they do not consider 
production nor transport constraints, which are important for competition in elec- 
tricity markets and other network industries, and they solve for linear asymmetric 
SFE with private information, similar to Kyle (1989) and Vives (2011), while we 
solve for non-linear symmetric SFE, similar to Klemperer and Meyer (1989). 
 
 
2    The model 
 
We shall consider markets for a single commodity that is traded over a network 
consisting of M  nodes (markets) that are connected by N directed transport arcs 
(lines).  We assume that each pair of nodes are connected by at most one arc. The 
network is connected, so that there is at least one path (chain of arcs) between 
every two nodes in the network.  Thus we have that N > M - 1. As is standard in 
graph theory, the topology of the network can be described by a node-arc incidence 
matrix A [11].12   This matrix A has a row for every node and a column for every 
arc, and ik-th element aik  defined  as follows13 
( 
-1,   if arc k is oriented away from node i, 
aik - 
}
 
  
1,  if arc k is oriented towards node i, 
0,  otherwise. 
 
 
Every arc starts in one node and ends in another node,  so by definition we have 
that the rows of A add up to a row vector with zeros.  Thus the rows are linearly 
dependent.  It can be shown that the incidence matrix A of a connected network 
has rank M - 1 [11]. 
The transported quantity in arc k is represented by the variable tk  which can 
be positive or negative, the latter indicating a flow in the opposite direction from 
the  orientation  of the  arc.  Thus  the  ith  row of At represents  the  flow of the 
commodity into node i from the rest of the network.  Transportation is assumed 
to be lossless and costless, but each arc k has a capacity Kk , so the vector t of arc 
flows satisfies 
-K ::; t ::; K  (1) 
 
1 1 Some auctions, such as security auctions by the US treasury, use purchase constraints to 
prevent buyers from cornering the market. 
1 2 This is different to Wilson [45] who describes the network with  power transfer distribution 
factors (PTDFs). 
1 3 Many authors adopt a different convention in which aik  = 1 if arc k is oriented away from 
node i. 
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At each node i there are ni  suppliers who play a simultaneous move, one shot 
game.  Each supplier offers a nondecreasing differentiable supply function 
 
Qig (p) ,   - 1,  , , ni, 
 
that defines how much each firm is prepared to supply at price p. For simplicity 
we assume that each firm is only active in one node.  Non-strategic net-demand at 
each node i is Di(p) + ci,14  where Di(p) is a nonincreasing function of p and ci  is 
a random local shock having a known probability distribution with joint density 
j (cl , c2 ,     , cM ).   The  demand  shocks are  realized  after  firms  have committed 
to  their  supply  functions.   We  denote  the  total  deterministic  net-supply  in each 
node by Si (pi) - 
Lni
 Qig (pi) Di(pi) and the vector with such components by 
ni s(  ). We also introduce Si,-g (pi) - 
L
 Qih (pi) - Di(pi), which excludes the 
supply of firm    from the deterministic net-supply in node i. 
We assume that the commodity is traded at the local market price of each node. 
In electric power networks this is called nodal pricing or locational marginal 
pricing (LMP)  [15][23][39]. There  is  no storage  in the  nodes.  Thus  net-imports 
to each node must be equal to net-consumption in each node (consumption net of 
production).  Hence, for each realization e the market will  be cleared by a set of 
prices  that defines how much each supplier produces,  how much is consumed in 
every node and what is transported through the network. 
At( ) - e - s(  ) (2) 
There are many small price-taking arbitrageurs active in the network or one regu- 
lated, price-taking network operator.  After the demand shocks have been realized, 
the  arbitrageurs  buy in some nodes,  transport  the  commodity  through  the  net- 
work without violating its physical constraints, and then sell it in other nodes. The 
market is cleared when all profitable feasible arbitrage trades have been exhausted. 
Consumers and arbitrageurs are all price-takers.  Thus if producers bid their 
true marginal costs, market clearing would lead to a competitive social welfare 
maximizing outcome.  Arbitrage opportunities and the resulting clearing are the 
same for given supply function bids from producers, irrespective of their true pro- 
duction costs.  Thus one way to compute the market clearing that the price-taking 
arbitrageurs  give  rise  to  is  to  solve  for the  social  welfare  maximizing outcome 
that would occur if submitted supply function bids would represent true marginal 
costs.  We say that price-taking arbitrageurs lead to an outcome that maximizes 
stated social welfare.  This is often how electricity markets with locational mar- 
ginal pricing are cleared in practice and in theoretical models of such markets 
[15][17][18][26][45]. 
We solve for a Nash equilibrium of supply function bids, also called Supply 
Function  Equilibrium  (SFE).  In this  derivation,  we  assume that  each producer 
is risk-neutral and chooses its supply function in order to maximize its expected 
profit.   Ex-post,  after  demand  shocks have  been realized  and prices  and firms' 
 
1 4 Note that this is net-demand,  so it is not necessarily non-negative. For example, fluctuating 
wind-power from small non-strategic firms can result in negative net-demand shocks. 
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outputs have been determined, the profit of firm  in node i is given by 
 
ITig (p, q) - pq - Cig (q) , (3) 
 
where  p is  the  local price  in node i,  q  is  the  output  of the  firm  and Cig (q)  is 
the firm's production cost, which is differentiable, convex and increasing up to its 
capacity constraint qig .We let p > C t 
( 
ig 
) 
be a reservation price.15 
The residual demand curve of a firm is the market demand that is not met by 
other firms in the industry at a given price.  The slope of this curve is important 
in the calculation of a firm's optimal supply function.  The demand shocks are 
additive, so they will not change the slope of a firm's residual demand,  as long as 
the same set of arcs are congested in the cleared market.  Thus similar to Wilson 
[45] we find it useful to group shock outcomes for which the same set of arcs are 
congested in the cleared market.  If two market outcomes for different e realizations 
have exactly the same arcs with tk - -Kk  and the same arcs with tk - Kk   then 
we say that they are in the same congestion state w. For each congestion state, 
we denote by L(w), B(w), and U (w) the sets of arcs where flows are at their lower 
bound (i.e.  congested in the negative direction), between their bounds or at their 
upper bound, respectively. 
 
 
2.1     Optimality conditions 
 
As in Anderson and Philpott [4], we use the market distribution function 'l/ig (p, q) 
to characterize the uncertainty in the residual demand curve of firm     in node i. 
For given supply functions of the competitors this function returns the probability 
that the realized residual demand curve of firm    is to the left of the point (p, q).16 
We also refer to this as the rejection probability of the point offer (p, q) for firm 
in node i.  The market distribution function can be used to calculate the expected 
pay-off from the following line-integral [4] 
  
 
 
Qig  PJ 
ITig (p, q)d'l/ig (p, q) (4) 
Thus,  for any offer curve  Qig (p), the  market  distribution  function  contains  all 
information of the residual demand that a firm needs to calculate its expected 
profit.17   We define 
 
z (p, q) - 
 ITig     'l/ig  'l/ig   ITig - - 
(
p - C t  (q)
)  'l/ig  'l/ig - q 
 
(5)  q  p  q  p ig  p  q 
 
1 5 The reservation price is the highest price that the auctioneer is willing to pay for the com- 
modity.  Most auctions have reservation prices. 
1 6 Note that the market distribution  function is analogous to Wilson's [46] probability distribu- 
tion of the market price, which returns acceptance probabilities for offers. The main contribution 
of Anderson and Philpott's analysis is that it provides a global second-order condition for opti- 
mality. 
1 7 Anderson and Philpott  derived the optimality  condition for a firm in a single node. Their 
analysis did not consider network effects.   However, it does  not matter  whether the rejection 
probability is driven by properties of the demand, competitors' supply functions or properties of 
the network. The optimality  condition can be applied as long as the firm's accepted production 
is paid a (local) marginal price. 
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( 
 
It can be shown that a supply function Qig (p) is globally optimal if it satisfies [4] 
 
} z (p, q) > 0 if q < Qig (p) 
z (p, q) - 0 if q - Qig (p) 
z (p, q) ::; 0   if q > Qig (p) 
(6) 
 
In addition  it is  necessary  for a local optimum that  these  conditions  are  locally 
satisfied at q - Qig (p). 
 
 
p 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
q 
 
Figure  1   Example  where  contours  of 'l/ig (q, p) (thin)  are  linear.   Isoprofit  lines 
for nig (q, p) are dashed.  The optimal curve q - Qig (p) (solid) passes through the 
points where these curves have the same slope. 
 
In the simple case when  the randomization is such that possible residual de- 
mand curves  do not  cross  each  other,  then  contours  of 'l/ig (p, q)  correspond  to 
possible realizations of the residual demand curves.  In this case, the profit of firm 
in node i is globally maximized if the payoff is globally optimized for each contour 
of 'l/ig (p, q), i.e.  the optimal supply function is ex-post optimal as in Klemperer 
and Meyer's single node model [29]. As illustrated in Figure 1, a necessary condi- 
tion for this is that the supply function Qig (p) crosses each contour of 'l/ig (p, q) at 
a point where the latter is tangent to the firm's isoprofit line.  Supply functions are 
no longer ex-post optimal when the market distribution function is generated by a 
randomization over crossing residual demand curves, but Anderson and Philpott 
show that the necessary condition still holds.  The explanation is that as long as 
the  market  distribution  function  is  the  same,  expected  profits  and the  optimal 
offer for firm    do not change according to (4). 
 
 
3    Radial networks 
 
We  begin  our analysis  by focusing  on radial networks  (i.e.   trees  with  M  nodes 
and N - M - 1 arcs forming an acyclic connected graph). The generalization to 
meshed networks with N  > M - 1 is presented in Section 4. In radial networks 
there is a unique path (chain of arcs) between any two nodes in the network.  Thus 
network flows are straightforwardly determined by net-supply in the nodes, which 
10  
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simplifies  the  clearing  process  of the  market.   We  define p to  be the  vector  of 
non-negative shadow prices (one for each arc) for flows in the positive direction. 
Similarly, we define u to be the vector of non-negative shadow prices (one for each 
arc) for flows in the negative direction.  Hence, the market clearing conditions for 
a radial network are18 
AT - p - u 
0 ::; p l_ K - t > O 
0 ::; u l_ K + t > O 
At( ) + s(  ) - e 
 
 
(7) 
 
The  first  condition  states  that  the  shadow price  for the  arc gives  the  difference 
in nodal prices between its endpoints.  The second and third set of conditions are 
called complementary slackness.  They ensure that there are no feasible profitable 
arbitrage trades in the radial network.  If two nodes are connected by a congested 
arc then the price at the importing end will be at least as large as the price in the 
exporting end. Another implication of the complementary slackness conditions is 
that nodes connected by uncongested arcs will form a zone with the same market 
price. We say that such nodes are completely integrated. The fourth condition 
ensures that net-demand equals net-imports in every node. 
Recall  that  for a given  congestion  state  w, L(w),  B(w),  and U (w) are  the 
sets of arcs where flows are at their lower bound (i.e.  congested in the negative 
direction), between their bounds or at their upper bound, respectively.  Thus the 
complementary slackness conditions can be equivalently written as follows 
 
tk - Kk ,     k  - 0,     k  > 0,              k    U (w), 
tk     (-Kk , Kk )      k  - 0,     k  - 0,  k    
B(w), tk - -Kk ,     k  > 0,     k  - 0,           k    
L(w) 
 
Observe that given a congestion state w and arc k, there is at most one variable 
tk ,   k  or   k  that is not at a bound. 
Recall  that  A has rank M - 1 for radial networks,  so the  vector of prices 
cannot be uniquely determined from the first market clearing condition in (7) by 
the choice of p and u.  As in Wilson [45], we choose an arbitrary node i to be a 
trading hub with nodal price p. Let lM -l be a column vector of M - 1 ones and 
OM -l be a column vector of M - 1 zeros.  Let Ai be row i of matrix A, and let 
A-i   be matrix  A with  row i eliminated.   For connected  radial networks,  it can 
be shown that A-i  is non-singular with determinant +1 or -1 [10]. Thus we can 
introduce 
E - 
 (
A - 
)    -l (8) 
 
We partition t, A, E and the shadow prices u and p into (tL, tB , tU ), (AL, AB , 
AU ), (EL, EB , EU ), (uL, OB , OU ) and (OL, OB , pU ) corresponding to flows at their 
lower bounds, strictly between their bounds, and at their upper bounds. 
 
1 8 Section 4 provides a generalized and more formal derivation of these Karush-Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions. 
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Lemma 1    n a radial network nodal prices -i  can be expressed in terms of the 
price of the trading hubb pb and the shadow prices  
 
-i  - plM -l + EU  wJpU   wJ - EL wJuL  wJ (9) 
 
Proof.  We  know that  the  columns  of A  sum to  a column vector  of zeros. 
Hence, 
(A-i)   lM -l + Ai  - OM -l 
-l 
(A-i) Ai  - -lM -l 
 
Using  this  result,  we can write  the  market  clearing  condition  AT - p - u  as 
follows 
(A-i) -i+pAi    - p - u 
-l ( ) 
-i  - (A-i) p - u-pAi 
-l 
(10) 
-i  - plM -l +  (A-i) 
 
(8) now gives the stated result. 
(p - u) 
For any index set Y of columns of A (or equivalently any set Y of arcs) we will 
find it useful to define the volume that feasible flows and shadow prices associated 
with arcs in Y can span. Thus we define the sets 
 
T (Yl ) - {tYl     - KYl   ::; tYl   ::; KYl }, 
U (Y2 ) - {pY2    O ::; pY2 }, 
.C(Y3 ) - {uY3    O ::; uY3 } 
(11) 
 
T (Yl ) is the volume in t space that the flows in a set of uncongested arcs Yl  can 
span. U (Y2 ) and .C(Y3 ) are the volumes in u and p space spanned by the shadow 
prices of congested arcs in the sets Y2  and Y3 , respectively.  In particular we are 
interested in S (w) �  IRM -l , which we define by 
S (w) - .C(L(w)) x U (U (w)) x T (B(w))  (12) 
Hence, S (w) is the total volume in t, u and p space that is spanned for a congestion 
state w. 
 
 
3.1     Optimality conditions for radial networks 
 
In the  following we  take  supply  functions  Q h (p)  of the  competitors  as  given 
and we want  to  calculate  the  best  response  of firm i in node   .  For notational 
convenience we let node i,  the node under study,  be the trading hub with price 
p.19  We denote by   (p, p, u)  the vector of nodal prices defined by (9), where we 
choose  to  suppress  the  dependence  on w for notational  convenience.   We  define 
s (  ,q) to be the vector of nodal net-supply functions with jth component 
   
q + 
Lni 
 
Sih (p) - Di(p),   j - i, Ln  h   l,h/   g (13) 
h   l S h (p  ) - D  (p  ) j /- i 
 
1 9 The trading hub is moved and a new price relation as in (9) is calculated when optimality 
conditions are derived for a firm in another node. 
node. Also the remainder of the network is not necessarily connected. 
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B  wJ 
(t 
 
  tF 
tF 
A k k 
) 
k 
l 
 
For each  state  w we  partition  the  nodes  into  the  sets  2 (w) and F (w).   2 (w) 
includes all nodes that are completely integrated with node i (the trading hub), 
where firm     is located, through some uncongested chain of arcs.  The set F (w) 
contains all other nodes in the network.  Similarly we partition the shock vector 
into  e3 wJ   and eF wJ.   The  arcs  are  partitioned  as  follows.   We  let  t3 wJ   be  the 
flows  in the  uncongested  arcs  between  nodes  in the  set  2 (w) and we  let  tF wJ 
be the  vector  of flows  in the  other  arcs.   In particular,  the  vector  tF denotes 
uncongested flows in the other arcs.  M3 wJ  is the number of nodes in 2 (w) and 
we note that they must be connected by M3 wJ - 1 uncongested arcs.  We use the 
node-arc  incidence  matrix  A3 wJ   to  describe  the  connected  radial network  with 
nodes in 2 (w) and arcs with uncongested flows t3 wJ  connecting nodes in this set. 
We  let  AF wJ   be a node-arc  incidence  matrix  with  M - M3 wJ   rows/nodes  and 
M - M3 wJ  columns/arcs, describing the rest of the network.  20 
 
Proposition 1   n a radial networkb the optimal output q  of firm    at price p in 
node i can be determined from the following z  function  
  
z - 
(
p - C t  (q)
)   St 
 
 
(p) + 
  
\ 
 
St (p)       (p, q, w) - q 
       
   (p, q, w)  
 
 
where 
ig i,-g 
w 
k 
kE3 wJ\i 
 
w 
(14) 
 
  (p, q, w)   - 
J
 
S wJ   
j (At + s (  (p, p, u), q)) JF (w)dtB  wJdpU  wJduL  wJ (15) 
  
 
JF (w)   - 
eF wJ  (16) F 
B  wJ , pU  wJ, uL  wJ)  
 
 ow k  of the  acobian matrix  BF w  
B w  , U w  ,crL w  
can be constructed as follows for 
the state w  
  \ 
eF wJ       - 
B  wJ, pU  wJ, uL wJ k 
 
 
 
F 
B  wJ    k 
 
 
 
St (pk ) 
(
EU wJ
)
 
 
 
 
-St  (pk ) 
(
EL wJ
)
k 
 
for k F (w) 
(17) 
 
Proof.  In order  to  apply the  optimality  conditions  in (5) and (6), we need 
to  derive  the  market  distribution  function  'l/ig (p, q).   It is  the  probability  that 
firm     in node i sells  less  than  q  units  if the  market  price  in node i is  p. Thus 
the calculation of this function involves determining a market outcome for every 
realization of the vector e, and then integrating the density function j over the 
volume in c-space that corresponds to firm   's point offer (p, q) being rejected.  In 
the  general  case this  volume  is  complicated  and it is  even more complicated  to 
 
2 0 Note that the remainder of the network has at least one arc that is lacking its start or end 
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differentiate 'l/ig (p, q) (we need such derivatives in our optimality conditions) if one 
follows this direct approach. Like Wilson [45], we avoid this by transforming the 
problem into one where we instead integrate over the flows and shadow prices that 
arise in each congestion state.  When calculating 'lji,g  P,qJ we keep the output of 
firm    fixed while the price p at node i is free to change. Thus we calculate 'l/ig (p, q) 
from the  probability  that  the  price  in node i,  n, is  below  p when firm   's  offer 
is fixed to q.  We want to transform the volume in e-space into a corresponding 
volume in t, u, p and n space for variables that are not at a bound. To make this 
substitution of variables when computing the multi-dimensional integral, we need 
the following factor to represent the change in measure [8, p. 368]. 
 
 
JP(w) - (t 
e 
, p , u 
 
,n
)  , (18) 
B  wJ U  wJ L wJ 
 
the absolute value of the determinant of the Jacobian matrix representing the 
change of variables.  Thus the probability that the market clearing price n at node 
i is less than p can be calculated from 
 
 
'l/i,g (p, q) - 
w 
 
P 
 
1r     -CXJ   S wJ 
 
 
j (At + s(  (n, p, u), q)) JP(w)dtB  wJdpU  wJduL  wJdn, 
 
(19) 
where S (w) is defined in (12). It is now straightforward to show that 
 
'l/i,g (p, q)  - 
p 
 
 
w S wJ 
 
j (At + s (  (p, p, u), q)) JP(w)dt 
 
 
B  wJ 
 
dpU  wJ 
 
duL wJ 
 
(20) 
 
When calculating   'lji,g  P,qJ  we keep p fixed in node i, while q, the output of firm   , 
is free to change.  Thus we calculate 'l/ig (p, q) from the probability that the firm's 
realized output, r, is q or lower when the price in node i is fixed to p. In this case, 
the substitution factor is given by 
 
 
Jq (w) - (t 
e 
, p , u 
 
,r
) . (21) 
B  wJ U  wJ L wJ 
 
The probability that the market clearing quantity r for generator at node i is 
less than q can now be calculated from 
 
 
'l/i,g (p, q) - 
w 
 
so 
 
q 
 
r  -CXJ   S wJ 
 
 
j (At + s (  (p, p, u), r)) Jq (w)dtB  wJdpU  wJduL  wJdr 
 
(22) 
 
'l/i,g (p, q)  - 
q 
 
 
 
w S wJ 
 
 
j (At + s (  (p, p, u), q)) Jq (w)dt 
 
 
B  wJ 
 
 
dpU  wJ 
 
 
duL wJ 
 
 
.   (23) 
 
The  next  step is  to  calculate  the  z function of firm  in node i.  We  substitute 
results in Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 (see Appendix A) into (20) and (23). Next, we 
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get (14) and (15) by substituting (20) and (23) into (5). JF (w) can be determined 
from Lemma 9 in the Appendix. 
Observe that (p, q, w) is a probability density in the sense that (p, q, w) dq 
is  the  probability  that  firm  is  dispatched  in the  interval  (q, q + dq) and the 
congestion state is w given that the clearing price is p. The term 
L
 (p, q, w) is 
then the probability that     is dispatched in the interval (q, q + dq) given that the 
clearing price is p. The first-order optimality condition is given by z (p, q) - 0, so 
it immediately follows from (14) that 
 
Corollary 1 The optimal  output q  of firm    in node  i at price  p satisfies  the 
first-order condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where 
 
q - 
(
p - C t  (q)
)
 
w 
 
 
t 
i,-g 
 
 
(p) + 
 
 
 
 
kE3 wJ\i 
\ 
 
St (p) 
 
 
(w p, q) , (24) 
(w p, q) :- L (p, q, w) 
w (p, q, w) 
is the conditional probability that the network is in state w giien that the price in 
node i is p and firm has output q 
 
In a single-node network, the optimal output of a producer is proportional to 
its mark-up and the slope of the residual demand that it is facing [29]. In a net- 
work with multiple connected nodes, producer     in node i only faces the slope of 
the net-supply in nodes that are completely integrated with its own node.  Thus 
according to Corollary 1, the slope of net-supply in each other node is scaled by 
the conditional probability that this node is completely integrated with node i. 
Hence, for multi-dimensional shocks, Klemperer and Meyer's condition generalizes 
to saying that the optimal output of a producer is proportional to its mark-up and 
the expected slope of the residual demand that it is facing.  This first-order con- 
dition is consistent with Wilson's results [45]. We notice that in case all arcs have 
unlimited capacities, we get the Klemperer and Meyer condition for a completely 
integrated  network.   The  other  extreme  when all arcs  have zero  capacity,  yields 
the Klemperer-Meyer equation for the isolated node i. 
 
Definition 1 For firm in node i we define the market integration function by 
 
 ig (p, q) - 
 
 
w   kE3 wJ 
(w p, q) - M3 wJ (w p, q) 
w 
 
Thus, the market integration function is equal to the expected number of nodes 
(including node i itself ) that are completely integrated with node i given that firm 
has output q and node i has the market price p. 
 
Lemma 2   n a symmetric equilibrium where each node has demand  D (p) and n 
producers each submitting a supply function Q (p)b the first-order condition can be 
written 
Q - (p - C t (Q)) ((   (p, Q) n - 1) Qt -   (p, Q) Dt ) (25) 
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Proof. We first substitute Sk (p) - nQ (p)-D (p) and Si,-g (p) - (n - 1) Q (p)- 
D (p) into (24). 
 
Q - 
(
p - C t  (Q)
)
 
w 
 
 
(n - 1) Qt - Dt  + 
 
 
 
 
kE3 wJ\i 
\ 
 
(nQt - Dt ) 
 
 
(w p, Q) 
We have 
L 
 
(w p, q) - 1 and by definition i 2 (w), so it follows from Definition 
1 that 
L
 
L 
kE3 wJ\i (w p, q) - (p, Q) - 1. Thus 
Q - 
(
p - C t  (Q)
) 
((n - 1) Qt - Dt  + (   (p, Q) - 1) (nQt - Dt )) , 
 
which gives (25). 
 
 
3.2     Examples 
 
By means of Corollary 1 we are able to construct a first-order condition for each 
firm in a radial network.   The  supply  function  equilibrium  (SFE)  can be solved 
from a system of such first-order conditions for general radial networks.  The global 
second-order condition of an available first-order solution can be verified by (6). 
In this section we use these optimality conditions to derive SFE for two-node and 
star networks with symmetric firms. 
 
 
3.2.1    Two node network 
 
Consider a simple network with two nodes connected by one arc from node 1 to 
node     with flow t    [-K, K ].  We derive the optimality condition for a firm in 
node 1, and thus we pick node 1 as being the trading hub with price p. It can be 
shown that 
 
Lemma 3   n a two-node networkb firm   s optimality condition in node 1 is giien 
by 
z (p, q) - (p - C t (q))(St - (p) + S
t (p)) (p, q, wl ) 
+(p - C t (q))St - (p) ( (p, q, w2 ) + (p, q, w3 )) (26) 
 
 
where 
-q( (p, q, wl ) + (p, q, w2 ) + (p, q, w3 )) - 0, 
 
 
K
 
(p, q, w ) - 
J 
-K j (q + Sl, -g (p) - t, S2 (p) + t) dt 
(p, q, w2 ) - 
J CXJ
 
5 
 5  PJ-K
 
j (q + Sl, -g (p) - K, c2 ) dc2 (27) 
(p, q, w3 ) - 
J
 
 
Proof. See Appendix B 
 
-CXJ j (q + Sl,- g (p) + K, c2 ) dc2 
Figure 2 gives a geometric view of the probabilities in (27) for the special case 
when firm    is the only producer in node 1, so that Sl,-g (p) - 0. 
 
Below we consider symmetric NE for symmetric firms and symmetric shock 
densities.    The  existence  of an equilibrium  depends  on the  partial  derivatives 
ji (cl , c2 ),  i - 1,  ,  of the  shock  density  which must  be  sufficiently  small.    It 
can be shown that symmetric solutions to (25) are equilibria under the following 
circumstances. 
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Figure 2  Computation of (p, q, w) when firm  is the only producer in node 1. 
The probability mass in the shaded area is equal to 'l/l,g (q, p), the probability that 
the residual demand curve of firm  is to the left of the point (p, q). The values of 
(p, q, w) are integrals along the right-hand boundary of this region as shown. 
 
 
Proposition 2 Consider  a two-node  network  with  n  symmetric  firms  in each 
nodeb  each  firm haiing  identical  production  capacities q   and identical  marginal 
costs  that are  either  constant or strictly  increasing      f demand  is  inelastic  up 
to a reseriation  price  p > C t (q)b  and has a bounded shock density  that satisfies 
j (cl , c2 ) - j (c2 , cl ) > 0 and  nq  ji (cl , c2 )  ::; (3n - ) j (cel , c2 ) when (cl , c2 ) 
[-K, q + K ] x [-K, q + K ] : {cl  + c2 ::;  q}b then there exists a unique symmetric 
supply  function  equilibrium  in the  networkb  where  each  firm s  monotonic  offerb 
Q (p)b can be calculated from 
 
 
Qt (p)   - 
Q 
(p - C t (Q)) (n   (nQ) - 1) 
(nQ, wl ) 
 
(28) 
(nQ)   - 1 + 
w (nQ, w) 
(29) 
 
for p (C t (0) , p] with the initial condition Q (p) - q    The probabilities (nQ, w) 
are giien by 
(nQ, w ) - 
J 
-K j (nQ - t, nQ + t) dt 
(nQ, w2 ) - 
J CXJ
 
(nQ, w ) - 
J nQ-K 
-CXJ 
j (nQ - K, c2 ) dc2 
j (nQ + K, c2 ) dc2 
(30) 
 
Proof. See Appendix B 
Symmetric  offers  Q (p) depend  on the  number  of firms  per  node  and their 
production costs.  Still, for inelastic demand and symmetric equilibria, it can be 
noted from (29) that the market integration function    (nQ) only depends on the 
total nodal output and exogenous parameters   the demand shock distribution and 
production and transport capacities.  The market integration function does not 
depend on market competitiveness or firms' production costs.  The reason is that 
consumers are in this case insensitive to the price,  so the number of production 
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units  that  are  needed to  meet  a given  demand  shock outcome  does not  depend 
on market competition nor production costs.  Moreover,  the order in which pro- 
duction units of symmetric firms are accepted is the same irrespective of their 
symmetric mark-ups.  It follows from (28) that oligopoly producers will increase 
their mark-ups at output levels where the market integration function    (nQ) is 
small,  i.e.   when the  arc is  congested  with  a high conditional  probability.   Simi- 
larly, oligopoly producers will decrease their mark-ups at output levels where the 
market integration function is large. 
In the  next  step  we will  explicitly  solve  for symmetric  SFE in the  two-node 
network.  To simplify the optimality conditions we consider the case where demand 
shocks follow a bivariate uniform distribution. 
Assumption 11 Consider a network with two nodes connected by an arc with 
capacity  K  and with  n symmetric  firms  in each node     nelastic  demand in each 
node  is  giien  by  ci.    We  assume that shocks  are  uniformly  distributed  with  a 
constant densityb   l  , on the  surface  (cl , c2 )      [-K, nq + K ] x [-K, nq + K ]  : 
{0 ::; cl  + c2 ::;  nq} and zero elsewhere 
 
Proposition 3 Make Assumption 1b then the symmetric market integration func- 
tion for a two node network is giien by 
 
- 1 + (wl  p, q) - 
 
4K + nq 
(31) 
K + nq 
 
Solutions  to  (25  are  SFEb  and the  inierse  symmetric  supply  functions  can be 
calculated from 
 
pQ n-l p (Q) - Q-l (Q) -     
q n-l 
 
 
+ (  n 
 
- 1) Q n-l 
 
q C t 
 
Q 
 
(u) du 
u n 
 
 
(32) 
 
Proof. See Appendix B. 
It follows from Proposition 3 that the market integration function     simplifies 
to a constant for uniformly distributed demand shocks. In this case, the equilib- 
rium offer of a firm in the two-node network with n symmetric firms per node is 
identical to the equilibrium offer of a firm in an isolated node with    n symmetric 
firms.  Fig.  3 illustrates how the total supply function in a node depends on   n 
if the total production capacity in each node is kept fixed.  As the equations are 
identical, the symmetric SFE of the network also inherits the following properties 
from the single node case [24][25]. 
 
Corollary 2 Solutions to  3(5 haie the following properties 
 
1. Mark-ups are positive for a positive output. 
 
2. For a given nodal production cost function, mark-ups decrease at every nodal 
output level with more firms in the market. 
 
Proposition 2 ensures existence of equilibria when slopes in the shock density 
are sufficiently small.  However, existence is problematic for steep slopes in the 
shock density and especially so when  it has discontinuities.  This is illustrated by 
the non-existence example below. 
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Figure 3  Nodal supply curve in one node with inelastic demand up to a reserva- 
tion price and constant marginal costs up to a fixed nodal production capacity. 
The network is symmetric with n firms per node.  Demand shocks are uniformly 
distributed so that the market integration function     is constant. 
 
 
Example 1 Shock densities with discontinuities   Assume that the support of the 
shock cib i   {1,   } is giien by [0, c]  The density is differentiable inside the support 
setb but decreases discontinuously to zero when cl  - c and c2       [0, c]b where 
 
K  < c < q + K b (33) 
 
which  would  iiolate  Assumption  1     Consider  a  potential  symmetric  NE  of  a 
duopoly market  with  one  firm in each node  with  identical  costs  C (q)    Assume 
that the symmetric supply functions Q (p) are monotonicb that demand is inelas- 
ticb  so that Si (p) - Q (p)     n the  following  we will  show that firm 1 will  haie  a 
profitable  deiiation  from the  potential  symmetric  pure-strategy  NE    n particular 
we will consider the point (qO , pO ) where 
 
qO  - Q (pO ) - c - K  (34) 
 
t follows from  335 that qO         (0, q)   Thusb unlike the distribution in Assumption 
1b  the  shock density  can reach  its  discontinuity  eien  if the  transport  capacity  is 
non-binding   From  ( 5 and symmetric supply functions we haie 
 
 
 
 
 
and accordingly 
 
(p, q, w3 ) - 
Q PJ-K 
 
-CXJ 
 
j (q + K, c)dc 
 
 
lim 
qjc-K 
 
(p, q, w3 ) >   lim 
q c-K 
 
(p, q, w3 ) - lim 
q c-K 
Q PJ-K 
 
-CXJ 
 
j (q + K, c)dc - 0 (35) 
19  
i l 
 
Howeierb (p, q, wl ) and (p, q, w2 ) are still continuous at the point (qO , pO )   From 
( 5 we  haie 
 
 
(pO , qO , wl ) - 
K 
 
-K 
CXJ 
 
j (qO  - t, qO  + t)dt - 
K 
 
-K 
CXJ 
 
j (c - K - t, c - K + t)dt > 0 
(pO , qO , w2 ) - 
 
 
so   325 implies that 
 
K +qO 
j (qO  - K, c)dc - 
c 
j (c - K, c)dc - 0 
 
lim 
q c-K    
w 
(pO , q, w) <  lim 
qjc-K    
w 
(pO , q, w) (36) 
 
A necessary condition for the solution being an equilibrium is that the optimality 
condition  in   5  is  locally satisfied  at the  point  (pO , c - K ) Thus we must haie 
lim 
qjc-K 
z (pO , q) > 0b but together with   ( 5 and  3 5 this would imply that 
 
lim 
q c-K 
z (pO , q) - (p - C t (qO ))Qt (pO ) (pO , qO , wl ) - qO ( lim 
q c-K    
w 
> (p - C t (qO ))Qt (pO ) (pO , qO , wl ) - qO ( lim 
qjc-K    
w 
(pO , q, w)) 
 
 
(pO , q, w)) 
- 0, 
 
which would iiolate the local second-order condition in   5b  and accordingly there 
is a profitable deiiation from the symmetric solution Q (p) 
 
The next example illustrates that existence of SFE is problematic if shocks are 
perfectly correlated.  Similar to the incentives to congest analysed by Borenstein 
et al.  [14], correlated shocks give a producer in an importing node the incentive 
to unilaterally deviate from the first-order solution by withholding power in order 
to congest the transmission line so as to increase the price of the importing node. 
 
Example 2 Perfectly correlated shocks: Consider two nodes connected by one 
arc    emand  shocks in the  two nodes are  perfectly  correlated    This  means that 
market prices are driien by a one-dimensional uncertainty  We assume that the 
demand shocks in both nodes are strictly increasing with respect to this underlying 
one-dimensional  shock 21   We also  assume that Dt < 0, i {1,   }b  so that St (p) 
 
2 1 In his analysis of perfectly correlated shocks, Wilson [45] focuses on the special  case when 
the shock at node 1 is fixed to zero. This means that regardless of deviations in node 2, exports 
from node 1 can never congest the arc below the price P* . Thus the profitable deviation that is 
outlined in our example does not exist in this special case.  We have found that ex-post optimal 
SFE can be constructed for such special cases. For similar reasons we have found that SFE can 
be constructed when demand shocks in the two nodes are negatively correlated. However, these 
equilibria are more complicated as one of the nodal shocks will decrease with respect to the 
underlying shock.  The price in this node will first increase with respect to the one-dimensional 
underlying shock until the arc is congested and then decrease with  respect to the underlying 
shock. Thus such SFE are not ex-post optimal. 
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and St (p) are always strictly positiie   Thus both nodal prices are strictly increasing 
in the underlying shockb and there is a one-to-one mapping between the underlying 
shock and each nodal price    n equilibriumb firms maximize their profits by choosing a  
supply function that optimizes  the  output for each price  and shockb  so that the 
equilibrium  becomes  ex-post  optimal  as in !lemperer  and Meyer  s   (9   model of 
single markets   Without loss of generalityb  assume that the arc from node 1 to ( 
is  congested  at the  price  p*   and uncongested  in some range  (p, p* )   Assume that 
the first-order condition results in a well-behaied monotonic s 
�
tion for each firm 
where  mark-ups  are  strictly  positiie  in the  range  (p, p* ]    Consider  a firm     in �  
node (  the  importing  node5b  with  the  first-order  solution  Q2g (p) We  choose p 
suuciently  close  to p*   and assume that the  shock density  is  well-behaied  so th 
�
 
(p, q, wl ) + (p, q, w2 ) + (p, q, w3 ) is well-defined and bounded away from zero 
p, p* ) x (Q2g (p) , Q2g (p* ))  To simplify the analysis we consider the 
case when firms haie const t marginal costs   We use  ( 5 and consider the ratio 
 
Z5g   P,qJ z�2g (p, q) :- - (p - C t )(St (p) + St (p)) (wl  p, q)  
P  P,q,wJ 
w 
2g l 2,-g 
+(p - C t t 2,-g (p) (w2     w3 p, q) - q, 
 
P  P,q,wl J 
P  P,q,wl J+P  P,q,w5 J+P  P,q,w3 J 
 
is the conditional probability that the 
P  P,q,w3 J+P  P,q,w5 J
 
arc  is  uncongested  and (w2     w3 p, q)  - P  P,q,wl J+P  P,q,w5 J+P  P,q,w3 J   is  the  condi- 
tional  probability  that the  arc  is  congested t follows from our assumptions  that 
the first-order solution satisfies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and that 
 
(wl  p, Q2g (p)) - 
(w2     w3 p, Q2g (p))   
- 
1 if p < p* 
0   if p > p* 
0 if p < p* 
1   if p > p* 
 
 
 
(37) 
z2g (p, Q2g (p)) - z�2g (p, Q2g (p)) - 0 (38) 
p, p* ) Since St (p) > 0 and mark-ups are strictly positiie
 
Consider a price pO (�  l 
for p (p, p* )b �  
 
pO  - C t 
 
St (pO ) >  inf 
 
{(p - C t 
 
)St (p)} - 6 > 0 2g   l P    P,P  J   2g l 
 
We proceed to construct a deiiation for the function Q2g (p)that improies the payoff 
of firm The  shock at node 1 is  increasing  in the  underlying  one-dimensional 
shockb so for prices pO   suuciently close to p*  it is possible for firm to withhold 
an amount of production  8O  (0, 6) so  that (wl  pO , Q2g (pO ) - 8O )  - 0 and 
(w2     w3 pO , Q2g (pO ) - 8O ) - 1    et 8l  be the infimum of such  8O  This implies 
that for eiery 8 
(
8l ,  �+8l 
)
 
z�2g (pO , Q2g (pO )) - z�2g (pO , Q2g (pO ) - 8)   - (pO  - C t 
 
)(St (pO ) + St 
 
(pO )) - Q2g (pO ) 2g 
-((pO  - C t 
l 
t 
2,-g 
2,-g 
(pO ) - (Q2g (pO ) - 8)) 
- (pO  - C t )St (pO ) - 8 
> 
6 - 8l 
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2g )S 
2g l 
2 
 
t follows from  385 that for eiery 8 
(
8l ,  �+8l 
)
b z�2g (pO , Q2g (pO )-8) < -( �-8l ) <  
0b and so 
2 
 
 
z2g (pO , Q2g (pO ) - 8) < -h( 
 
 
6 - 8l 
2 
 
 
) (39) 
 
 for some constant h > 0b where h is less than or equal to the infimum of (pO , Q2g (pO ) - 8, wl )+ 
(pO , Q2g (pO ) - 8, w2 ) + (pO , Q2g (pO ) - 8, w3 ) oier 8 
(
8l ,  �+8l 
)  
Withholding 
less than 8l  units at pO   only has a second-order effect on z�2g  and z2g    The deiia- 
tion in Q2g (pO ) starts at p8 < pO b  which we define by 
 
Q2g (p8 ) - Q2g (pO ) - 8 
 
We assume that pO  is suuciently close to p* b so that we can find a suuciently small 
8 
(
8l ,  �+8l 
) 
to ensure  that p8 > p For some � l  > 0b  when p (p8 + � l , pO )b 2 �  
the line is   ongested when the offer Q 
 
(p ) at price p t follows from  385 and
 
c 
3 5 that 
is 2g 8 
 
z�2g (p, Q2g (p8 ))   - z�2g (p, Q2g (p8 )) - z�2g (p, Q2g (p)) 
- (p - C t t 2,-g (p) - Q2g (p8 ) 
-((p - C t )(St (p) + St (p)) - Q2g (p)) 2g l 2,-g 
- Q2g (p) - Q2g (pO ) + 8 - (p - C t )St (p) 
 
<  - (6 - 8) < -( 
6 - 8l )
 
 
 
for p (p8 + � l , pO )   Thus 
 
 
z2g (p, Q2g (p8 )) < -k( 
 
 
 
6 - 8l )
 
 
for p (p8 + � l , pO ) and some positiie 
 
k ::; inf 
PE P8 + l ,PO J 
{ (p, Q2g (p8 ), wl ) + (p, Q2g (p8 ), w2 ) + (p, Q2g (p8 ), w3 )} 
 
Together with   395 this implies that if we integrate z along the deiiation defined 
by 8b then 
PO 
z2g (p, Q2g (p8 ))dp + 
P8 
Q5g   PO J 
 
Q5g   P8 J 
 
z2g (pO , q)dq < 0, (40) 
if we  choose   pO   suuciently  close  to p*   and 8        
(
8l ,  �+8l 
) 
suuciently  smallb  so 
that first-order  effects  dominate  second-order  effects      405  iiolates  a necessary 
local optimality  condition   4    The intuition  is  that a producer  in an importing 
node always  has an incentiie  to unilaterally  deiiate  from the  first-order  solution 
by withholding  power  in order  to congest  the  arc  at lower  prices  than p* b   which 
increases the price of the importing node 
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Figure 4  Star network example. 
 
 
3.2.2    Star network 
 
Next, we consider a star network with four nodes and three radial lines with 
capacity K , as shown  in Figure 4. We define all arcs to be directed towards the 
center node 4. Each arc has the same number as the starting node, i.e.  1,   or 3. 
Demand shocks are defined on the following region 8 
 
8 - (cl , c2 , c3 , c4 ) IR - K  ::; ci  ::; nq + K, -3K ::; c4 ::; 3K, 
l
 
0 ::; cl  + c2 + c3 + c4 ::; 3nq Vi {1,   , 3} 
 
and we let V2 be the volume of this region. 
Assumption  2.   Consider  a star  network  with  four nodes  and three  radial 
lines with capacity  K  directed towards the center node 4. There are  n firms with 
identical  costs  C (q)  in each node  1 - 3   There  are  no producers  in node  4  the 
center  node5.    nelastic  demand in nodes  i   {1,   , 3, 4}  is  giien  by  ci.     emand 
shocks are uniformly distributed such that 
 
 
j (e) - V5 if e 8 
0 otherwise. 
 
Thus the shock density and network are symmetric with respect to nodes 1,  , 3. 
We can show the following under these circumstances 
 
Proposition 4 Make Assumption (b then the symmetric market-integration func- 
tion is a constant giien by 
 
3 (nq)2  + 1 K nq + 1 K 2 
-    
3 (nq)2  + 8K nq + 4K 2 
 
(41) 
 
Solutions to  (25 are SFEb and the unique inierse supply function of each firm in 
nodes i {1,   , 3} is giien by   3(5 
 
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Figure  3 and Corollary 2 apply to  the  star  network  as  well.   It is  only the 
market integration function that depends on whether the network has two nodes 
or is star shaped. 
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4    Meshed network 
 
So  far we have  studied  radial networks,  where  there  is  a unique  path  between 
every pair of nodes.  Now we generalize our results to include more complicated 
networks  consisting  of M  nodes and N  arcs,  where  N  > M .  This  means that 
there will be at least one cycle in the network and there will be at least two paths 
between any two nodes in the cycle [11]. Thus we need to make assumptions of 
how the transport route is chosen for cases when there are multiple possible paths. 
Similar to Wilson [45] we assume that flows are determined by physical laws that 
are valid for electricity and incompressible mediums with laminar (non-turbulent) 
flows.   Such flows  are  sometimes  called  potential  flows,  because one  can model 
them as being driven by the potentials ¢ in the nodes. In case the commodity is a 
gas or liquid (e.g. oil), the potential is the pressure at the node. In a DC network 
it is the voltage that is the potential.22   For DC networks and laminar flows it can 
be shown that the electricity and flow choose paths that minimizes total losses. 
In a potential flow model,  the flow in the arc k is the result of the potential 
difference between its endpoints.  Given a vector of potentials ¢, we have 
(
AT¢
) 
tk - 
- k 
Xk 
(42) 
where - 
(
AT¢
)
k is the potential difference and Xk   is the impedance resisting the 
the flow through the arc. The impedance parameter is determined by the geomet- 
rical and material properties of the line/pipe that transports the commodity, and 
is independent of the flow in the arc. In a DC network, the impedance is given by 
the resistance of the line.23 
The matrix A has rank M - 1, so the potentials ¢ are not uniquely defined 
by (42). Thus we can arbitrarily choose one node (say i) and set its potential ¢i 
arbitrarily.  Similar to Wilson [45], we set the potential of this swing node to zero. 
This  corresponds  to  deleting  row i from A to  form the  matrix  A-i   with  rank 
M - 1 [41]. To simplify the analysis we rule out some unrealistic or unlikely cases 
we assume that the impedance is positive and that the capacities of the arcs and 
impedance factors are such that for any feasible flow, the set of arcs with flows at 
a lower or upper bound contains no cycles.  24 
As in the radial case, the market is cleared when all profitable feasible arbitrage 
trades have been exhausted.  Similar to Wilson [45] we solve for this outcome by 
 
2 2 For AC networks it is standard to calculate electric power flows by means of a C-load flow 
approximation, where ¢ is the vector of voltage phase angles at the nodes [15]. 
2 3 In  a DC-load flow approximation of an AC  network, Xk  represents  the reactance of the 
transmission line. 
2 4 This precludes certain degenerate solutions which can only arise if the values of the bounds 
and impedances for arcs forming a loop .C, satisfy equations of the form 
 
ok Xk Kk = 0 
k   
 
where ok  = 1 if arc k is oriented in the direction that .C is traversed and ok  = -1 otherwise. We 
can preclude instances having such solutions by perturbing the line capacities if necessary. 
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calculating feasible production,  consumption and transportation that maximizes 
stated social welfare, i.e.  the social welfare that would occur if producers' supply 
functions corresponded to their true costs.  In the literature this is referred to as 
an economic dispatch problem (EDP) [15][17]. 
EDP minimize 
LM Lni J qig  Q-l (x)dx - 
LM J yi  D-l (y)dy i l  g   l O ig i l  O i 
 
subject to   At + q - y - e, [  ] 
 
 
-K ::; t ::; K, [u, p] 
 
Xt - -AT¢ [.:\], 
 
The shadow prices for the constraints are shown on the right-hand side in brackets. 
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of EDP are 
 
KKT  AT + XT.:\ - p - u 
0 ::; p l_ K - t > O 
0 ::; u l_ K + t > O 
A.:\ - O 
At + s(  ) - e 
Xt - -AT¢ 
 
In radial networks the columns of the matrix A correspond to network arcs defining 
a tree, and so they are linearly independent (see [41]). This means that A.:\ - O 
has  a unique  solution  .:\ - O,  which allows  .:\  to  be  removed  from the  market 
clearing  conditions.   In this  case  the  conditions  become  the  same  as  those  for 
radial networks in (7). 
We now return to discuss the general case. The prices     that satisfy the KKT 
conditions in any congestion state w must meet certain conditions.  First observe 
that since X is diagonal and nonsingular, the following can be obtained from the 
first KKT condition 
X-l AT + .:\ - X-l (p - u)  (43) 
 
Multiplying by A and using the KKT condition that A.:\ - O yields 
AX-l AT - AX-l (p - u)  (44) 
In the context of power system networks the matrix AX-l AT is called a network 
admittance matrix, and when X is the identity it is a  aplacian matrix.  The matrix 
AX-l AT has rank M - 1, so the vector of prices     is not uniquely determined 
by the choice of p and u.  Recall that Ai is row i of matrix A, and A-i  is matrix 
A with row i eliminated.  As in section 3 we choose a node i, say, as trading hub 
and assign its price to be p. 
 
Lemma 4 Nodal prices   -i  can be expressed in terms of the priceb pb of the trading 
hub and the shadow prices 
 
-i  - plM -l + E(p - u),  (45) 
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1 l l 
-i -i 
1 
1 l l 
1 l l 
1 l l 
1 1 
1 l l 
 
where  
E - (A-iX- 
 
(A-i)  )- 
 
A-iX- 
 
 
(46) 
 
Proof. We can write (44) as follows 
 
AX-l     (A  ) + p (Ai) - AX-l (p - u) 
 
 
We can remove row i from this equation, multiply by (A-iX- 
rearrangements, so that 
AT )-l - and make 
 
-i - -(A-iX- (A-i)  )- A-iX- (Ai)   p 
+(A-iX- (A-i)  )- A-iX- (p - u) 
- plM -l + (A-iX- (A-i)  )- A-iX- (p - u)  (47) 
 
The last step follows as the columns of A  sum to a column vector of zeros, so 
 
(A-i)   lM -l + (Ai)   - OM -l 
A-iX- (A-i)   lM -l + A-iX- (Ai)   - OM -l (48) 
lM -l - -(A-iX- 
 
(45) and (46) follows from (47). 
(A-i)  )- A-iX- (Ai) 
 
 
 
l
 
Recall that A-i  is nonsingular in the radial case, which gives E - ((A-i)  )- 
as in (8). More generally, A-i  will have M - 1 rows and N > M - 1 columns, and 
so it will  not have an inverse.  As in the radial case, we denote by   (p, p, u)  the 
vector of nodal prices defined by (45), where we choose to suppress the dependence 
on w for notational convenience.  We let H  be a matrix with N - (M  - 1) rows 
forming a basis for the null space of A.  H  could for example be the rows of the 
orientation  vectors  of a set  of N - (M  - 1) cycles  in the  network  [41].  As  for 
the radial case we have  S(w) - L(w) x U (w) x B (w) .  However,  B (w) is more 
complicated in the meshed case 
 
B (w) - {tB : YB tB - -YLtL  - YU tU , -KB  ::; tB ::; KB }, (49) 
 
where Y - H X . 
 
Lemma 5 
 
'l/i,g (p, q)  - 
p 
 
 
 
 
 
w wJ 
 
 
 
j (At + s (  (p, p, u),q)) JP(w)dt 
 
 
 
 
B  wJ 
 
 
 
dpU  wJ 
 
 
 
duL wJ 
 
 
 
, (50) 
 
'l/i,g (p, q)  - 
q 
 
 
w wJ 
 
j (At + s (  (p, p, u),q) )) Jq (w)dt 
 
 
B  wJ 
 
dpU  wJ 
 
duL wJ 
 
,  (51) 
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Proof. By definition we have AHT - O, it follows for any ¢ that 
 
HAT¢ - O. 
Now the KKT conditions amount to 
e   - At + s(plM -l +E(p - u)) 
t [-K, K ] 
HXt  - -HAT¢ - 0 
 
We seek M  degrees of freedom in these equations that will  specify a range over 
which to integrate e. One free variable is given by either the price in node i, p, or 
the supply of firm   , q.  The remaining M - 1 degrees of freedom are integrated 
in the t, p and u  space.  If every t   (-K, K ) then p - u - O, and we have N 
variables and N - (M - 1) constraints from HXt - 0, so we are left with M - 1 
variables to integrate with.  For every component of t that is at a bound, we get a 
non-negative component of p or a component of u that is free to leave its bound. 
We partition Y - HX into YL, YB  and YU  corresponding to flows at the lower 
bound, between bounds and at the upper bound. We have Yt - O, so to integrate 
over a congestion state w we fix constrained components (tL - -K and tU  - K) 
of t to get 
YB tB - -YLtL  - YU tU 
 
and free unconstrained components of p and u to get uL and pU . Similar to the 
proof of Proposition 1, we get (50) and (51) by first keeping q fixed and then p. 
JP(w)  and Jq (w) are  defined by (18) and (21), respectively.   The  expressions 
(50) and (51) can be substituted into (5) and (6) to give optimality conditions in a 
meshed network.  Unfortunately, the determinants JP(w) and Jq (w) do not simplify 
as in the radial case.  In the radial case, each agent effectively faces a probability- 
weighted residual demand curve defined by Corollary 1. In the meshed  case the 
residual demand curve in a congestion state w involves combinations of the slopes 
of competitors' supply functions measured at different prices.  In other words, 
nodes in a meshed market  may be integrated  in a congestion  state  in the  sense 
that transport between their nodes is uncongested (with some adjustment in dis- 
patch) but still experience different prices.  This makes an analytical derivation of 
equilibrium a lot more challenging in mesh networks, except for some special cases 
(such as when all strategic agents are located in the same uncongested region). 
Numerical solutions to the optimality conditions could potentially be obtained for 
more general cases. 
 
 
5    Alternative market designs and  strategies 
 
Finally, we want to briefly note that our expressions in Sections 3.1 and 4 for how 
market distribution functions can be calculated in radial and meshed networks are 
not restricted to SFE in networks with nodal pricing.  They can also be used to 
calculate Cournot NE in networks with additive demand shocks.  We know from 
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P 
q 
 
Anderson and Philpott [4] that the optimality condition of a vertical offer q from 
firm  in node i facing an uncertain residual demand is 
 
P 
z (p, q) dp - 0 
O 
with the second-order condition that 
J P z 
 
(p, q) dp ::; 0. For radial networks with 
Cournot competition, z (p, q) can be calculated as in Proposition 1 if one sets the 
slope of net-supply in each node equal to the nodal demand slope. 
Our approach is not limited to cases with local marginal prices.  As long as 
arbitrageurs in the transport sector or the regulated network operator are price- 
takers, it is often straightforward to adjust our optimality conditions to networks 
with other auction formats.  For example, consider networks with discriminatory 
(pay-as-bid)  pricing as in the  electricity  market  of Britain.   Anderson  et  al.  [3] 
show that the optimality condition of a firm's offer in such an auction is given by 
25 
 
z - 
'l/ig 
p 
 
(p - C t  (q)) - 1 + 'l/ig 
 
(p, q) , 
 
and the  same conditions  as in (6).  For a radial network, 'ljig 
 
and 'l/ig 
 
(p, q)  are 
given by (19) and (20), respectively.  JP (w) can be calculated as in Lemma 7 (see 
Appendix A). 
 
 
6    Conclusions 
 
We derive optimality conditions for firms offering supply functions into a network 
with transport constraints and local additive demand shocks. In principle, a sys- 
tem of such optimality conditions can be used to numerically calculate asymmetric 
Supply  Function Equilibria  (SFE)  in a general  network.  In the  paper,  we focus 
on characterizing symmetric SFE in symmetric radial networks. We verify that 
monotonic solutions to the first-order conditions are Supply Function Equilibria 
(SFE) when the joint probability density of the local demand shocks is sufficiently 
evenly distributed, i.e.  close to a uniform multi-dimensional distribution. But ex- 
istence of SFE cannot be taken for granted.  Perfectly correlated shocks or steep 
slopes and discontinuities in the shock density will not smooth the kinks in the 
residual demand curves sufficiently well, and then profitable deviations from the 
first-order solution will exist. 
In an isolated node with one-dimensional additive demand shocks, the optimal 
output of a producer is proportional to its mark-up and the slope of the residual 
demand that  it is  facing.  We  show  that  in a network  with  multi-dimensional 
shocks, this generalizes  the optimal output of a producer is proportional to its 
mark-up and the expected slope of the residual demand that it is facing. Thus the 
probability  with  which the  producer's  node is  completely  integrated  with  other 
 
2 5 Note that  we have changed the sign of the Z  function in Anderson et al [3] for pay-as-bid 
markets to keep it consistent with the Z function used in this paper. 
28  
 
nodes, i.e.  connected to other nodes via uncongested arcs, is of great importance 
for the optimal offer. 
For symmetric  equilibria  it is  useful  to  define a market  integration  function, 
which equals the expected number of nodes that are completely integrated with a 
particular node; a node is always completely integrated with itself.  Firms' supply 
functions depend on the number of firms in the market.  Still it can be shown that 
in a symmetric equilibrium with inelastic demand, market integration is a function 
of the total nodal production in a node.  The function can be determined from 
exogenous parameters   the network topology, the demand shock distribution and 
production and transport capacities.  The implication is that oligopoly producers 
will have high mark-ups at output levels for which the market integration function 
returns small values, and lower mark-ups at output levels where market integration 
is expected to be high. 
The market integration function simplifies to a constant for inelastic demand 
with multi-dimensional uniformly distributed shocks in symmetric radial networks. 
We  use our optimality  conditions  to  explicitly  solve  for symmetric  equilibria  in 
two-node and star networks for such shocks.  We show that an equilibrium offer 
in a node of such a network  is  identical  to  the  equilibrium  offer in an isolated 
node  where  the  number  of symmetric  firms  per  node  have  been scaled  by the 
market integration function. Thus previous results for symmetric SFE in single 
node networks become applicable to symmetric SFE in symmetric radial networks 
with transport constraints.  We also show that these symmetric equilibria are well- 
behaved   (i) mark-ups are positive for a positive output, and (ii)  for a given total 
production cost, mark-ups decrease with more firms in the market. 
We focus on characterising SFE in radial networks, but we also show how our 
optimality conditions can be generalized to consider meshed networks, albeit with 
a significant  increase  in complexity.   We  also  present  optimality  conditions  for 
SFE in networks  with discriminatory pricing and Cournot  NE in networks  with 
uncertain demand. 
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Appendix A1 Properties of node-arc incidence ma- 
trices and  their implications for radial networks 
 
 
We start the appendix by exploring some special properties of the node-arc inci- 
dence matrix A for a radial network.  We have the following technical results. 
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i,-g (n) + k 
B  wJ 
  k 
t 
k 
 
Lemma 6 Suppose A is the node-arc incidence matrix for a radial network with 
M  nodes f j < M  then det A-    - - det A-    +lJ 
 
Proof. Introduce a new matrix W  which is identical to A-  , except that row 
j of A-  , which is  equal  to  A +l , has been replaced  by the  sum of all rows  in 
A-  .  Such manipulations are allowed without changing the determinant [41], so 
det (W)  - det A-  . Node-arc incidence matrices are such that W  , the sum of all 
rows in A-  , is equal to -A   (row j of A). Thus W  is identical to A-    +lJ except 
that elements have opposite signs in row j.  In the calculation of the determinants 
we can expand them along row j of both W  and A-    +lJ , which gives the stated 
result [41]. 
 
By applying Lemma 6  k - j times we get the following result. 
 
Corollary 3 f  A is  the  node-arc  incidence  matrix  for a radial  network  then 
k
 
(-1)  det A-    - (-1) det A-k 
 
In the three lemmas below we use Corollary 3 and other properties of node-arc 
incidence matrices to derive explicit expressions for the substitution factors JP(w) 
and Jq (w) in (18) and (21), respectively. 
 
Lemma 7 JP(w) - St 
L 
kE3 wJ\i S
t (n)   JF(w)b where 
 
eF wJ JF (w) -  (tF , pU  wJ, uL wJ) 
(52) 
 
Proof. We use n to denote the nodal price of the trading hub. Thus, given a 
state w, the price in node i and all nodes j  2 (w) is n (irrespective of pU  wJ  and 
uL wJ). Thus it follows from (2), (13) and (9) that 
 
c 
- st (p ) 
k 
c 
- st (p ) 
k 
 
p 
- 0, if j 2 (w) and k U (w) (53) 
k 
p 
- 0, if j 2 (w) and k L (w) (54) 
k 
c 
-   S
t (n) if j 2 (w) \i 
n  St,-g (n)  if j - i 
 
(55) 
 
The nodal flow balance in (2) can be written as follows 
 
A3 wJt3  wJ + s3 wJ(  )   - e3 wJ 
AF wJtF  wJ + sF  wJ(  )   - eF wJ. 
 
Thus   
(
e3 wJ
) 
(
t3 wJ
) 
(
e3  wJ
)
 
 
 
- 
(
A3 wJ
)
 
 
 
 
(56) 
  k 
F 
B  wJ 
- 0 (57) 
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and   
(
eF wJ
)
k 
(
tF wJ
) 
(
eF  wJ
)
k (
t3 wJ
)
 
 
 
- 
(
AF wJ
)
k (58) 
 
 
- 0 (59) 
 
From (53)-(59) we realize that 
 
 
e 
 
 
r 
A3 wJ  O 
-   B   
 
 
BB  w 
l 
1r 
BF  w 
 
 
 
 
(60) (
tB wJ, pU  wJ, uL wJ,n
)
 O ) 1r 
B w  ,  U  w  ,crL  w 
 
Let r 
A3 wJ  O 
1 
B - O   B    ) 
B w  ,  U  w  ,crL  w 
 
 
(61) 
 
When calculating J  (w) -     B   (tB  w  ,  U  w  ,crL  w  ,1r) 
, we will  expand the determinant 
along the  M th column in (60) with  entries   Bk giving the  net-supply  slopes  as 
shown in (55). It follows from (55) and the definition of the determinant that [41] 
 
 
JP(w) - 
 
(-1) 
k 
k+M ck det (B  ) n -k 
 
A3 wJ  is the node arc incidence matrix of a connected radial network.  This matrix 
has linearly  dependent  rows  and has rank M3 wJ  - 1.  Thus  it follows  from (61) 
that  det (B-k ) - 0 if k      F(w).   If k      2(w) then  B-k   is  a block matrix  with 
determinant   
(
A3 wJ
) 
-k 
JF(w).  Thus JP(w) can be written as 
 
JF (w) (-1) i+M t i,-g (n) det 
(
A3 wJ
) 
-i 
L 
kE3 wJ\i (-1) 
k+M St (n) det 
(
A3 wJ
) 
-k 
- JF(w)   St 
L 
kE3 wJ\i S
t (n) (-1) MB  w det 
(
A3 wJ
) 
-i 
 
by Corollary 3 and the monotonicity of net-supply functions.  Now, since A3 wJ  is 
the node-arc incidence matrix of a connected radial network, it follows from Bapat 
[10] (p. 13) that   (-1) MB  w det 
(
A3 wJ
)
 
- 
is 1. 
 
Lemma 8 Jq (w) - JF (w) 
 
Proof. We use r to denote the output of firm  in node i.  Thus, we have from 
(2) and (13) that 
ek  -  0 if k /- i 
r 1   if k - i 
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Similar to (60) we have 
 
 
e 
 
 
r 
A3 wJ  O 
-   B   
 
 
BB  w 
l 
r 
BF  w 
 
 
 
 
(62) (
tB wJ, pU  wJ, uL wJ,r
)
 O ) r 
B w  ,  U  w  ,crL  w 
 
 
As in the proof of Lemma 7, we expand the determinant     B   (tB  w  ,  U  w  ,crL  w  ,r) 
along 
the M th column, which has zeros in rows k /- i and a one in row i.  We use the 
definition of B  in (61), so it follows from the definition of the determinant that 
[41] 
 
Jq (w)   - (-1) i+M det (B-i)  - det (B-i) 
- 
(
A3 wJ
)
 
 
-i   JF 
 
(w) 
 
because B-i   is  a block matrix  with  determinant   
(
A3 wJ
)
 JF(w).   A3 wJ   is  a 
node-arc  incidence  matrix  of a connected  radial network.   Thus  it follows  from 
Bapat [10] (p. 13) that   det 
(
A3 wJ
)
 
-i 
is 1, which gives the stated result. 
 
Lemma 9 ow k of the acobian matrix BF  w 
B w  ,  U  w  ,crL  w 
can be constructed as 
follows for the state w 
 
 
eF wJ 
 
\ 
- AF St t 
l 
 
B  wJ, pU  wJ, uL wJ k 
 
for k F (w) 
 
B  wJ    k k 
(pk ) 
(
EU wJ
)
k -Sk (pk ) 
(
EL wJ
)
k 
 
(63) 
 
Proof. We partition the columns of AF wJ  into AF F B  wJ and A
F , cor- 
responding to flows tF being at their lower bounds, strictly between their bounds, 
and at their upper bounds. Thus the flow balance in (2) can be written as follows 
 
AF F F F
 
B  wJtB  wJ + AU wJtU  wJ + AL wJtL  wJ+sF  wJ (  ) - eF wJ (64) 
 
Observe that (9) implies that 
 
cF F
 
    k   - 
ck 
pk 
pk  - St (p ) 
(
E U  wJ
)
 
 
and  
cF F
 
    k   - 
ck pk  - St (pk
 ) 
(
E L wJ
) 
 
 
which gives the result. 
pk 
- k k 
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Appendix B1 Selected proofs 
 
Proof. (Lemma 3). Below we list the congestion states of the network and how 
we partition the nodes for each state 
 
State t   2 F 
wl (-K, K ) 0 0 {1,   } 0 
w2 
w3 
K 
-K 
[0, 00) 
0 
0 
[0, 00) 
{1} 
{1} 
{ } 
{ } 
We have from (2) that      
r 
cl 
1 r 
S (p ) 
1 r 
1 
1 
- + t (65) c2 S2 (p2 )     
S
  
p
 
J
    ,..
 
1 
   
 
  ,.. 
 
We have from (65) that   
 
State A3 AF A
F r 
-1  
1
 
l 1 0 0 
 
 
 
 
We also have 
 
 
 
Thus 
w2  0 1 0 
w3  0 1 0 
 
 
-l 
A-l  - 1 - (A-l )   - (A-l ) - E 
State   E3 EF EF F 
wl 1 0 0 0 
w2  0 1 1 0 
w3  0 1 0 1 
 
We set pl  - n, so it follows from (10) that 
p2 - n + - (66) 
The network is completely integrated in state wl , so eF wl J  is empty.  We only need 
the substitution factor JF (w) for states w2 and w3 . It follows from (17) and (66) 
that 
JF (w2 ) - 
BF  w5 
( )   
- St (p2 ) - St (n +  ) 
2 2 
U w2 
BF  w3
 
JF(w3 ) - (cr
 - -St  (p2 )  - St (n - )  
 
(15) now yields 
L w3   ) 2 2 
 
 
(p, q, wl ) - 
K 
j (At+s (  , q)) dt - 
-K 
K 
j (q + Sl,-g (p) - t, S2 (p) + t) dt, 
-K 
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e II Q P  JJ 
 
 
- 
J CXJ 
(p, q, w2 ) - 
J CXJ  j (At+s (  , q)) JF (w2 )d 
 
2 
and 
O      j (q + Sl,-g (p) - K, S2 (p +  ) + K ) S
t (p +  ) d 
(p, q, w3 ) - 
J CXJ  j (At+s (  , q)) JF (w3 )d 
- 
J CXJ 
2
 
O      j (q + Sl,-g (p) + K, S2 (p - ) - K ) S
t (p - ) d 
This gives us (27) after the substitutions c2 - S2 (p +  ) + K and c2 - S2 (p - ) - 
K , respectively, have been applied to the integrals of the states w2 and w3 .  The 
equation (26) follows from (14) and that the two nodes are only completely inte- 
grated in state wl . 
Proof. (Proposition 2). Symmetry of the network, costs and shock densities 
ensure that the optimal supply functions of all producers are given by identical 
optimality  conditions.   We  have S2 (p) - q + Sl,-g (p) - nQ (p) in a symmetric 
equilibrium with inelastic demand, so (30) follows from (27).  The differential 
equation  in the  statement  follows  from (26).  In case  that  production  capacity 
would bind at  some price  pb  < p then Q(p) is  inelastic  in the  range  (pb, p), and 
it follows  from (26) that  z (p, q)  < 0 when  q < q  and p     (pb, p).  This  would 
violate the second-order condition in (6), and it is necessary that this condition 
is locally satisfied [4]. Thus the production capacity must bind at the reservation 
price, which gives our initial condition. 
Next we show that the solution is unique.  It follows from the assumptions for 
j (cl , c2 ), our definition of    (nQ, w) and from Definition 1 that 
1 
 
(n   (nQ) - 1) > 0, 
 
and that    l   n    nQJ-lJ 
 
is Lipschitz continuous in Q. Consider a price p- 
 
(C t (0) , p). 
We now want to show that p - C t (Q (p)) is bounded away from zero in the range 
[p-, p]. This  is  obvious  for constant  marginal costs,  as  we  then  have  that p- - 
C t (Q (p-)) - p- - C t (0) > 0. For strictly increasing marginal costs we can use the 
following argument.  It follows from Picard-Lindelof 's theorem and p > C t (q) that 
a unique  solution  to  (28) must  exist  for some range  [pO , p].  In this  price  range 
the mark-up, p - C t (Q (p)), is smallest at some price p*  where the inverse supply 
function  is  at  least  as steep  as the  marginal cost  curve,  i.e.   Qt (p* ) ::;       l     . 
Thus it follows from (28) that 
 
p*  - C t (Q(p* )) > 
 
 
Q P  Je II Q P  JJ 
n    nQ  P  JJ-lJ 
This  is  bounded away from zero  whenever  Q(p* ) is  bounded away from zero  if 
marginal costs are strictly increasing.  In case Q(p* ) - 0 for some price p*  > C t (0), 
it follows from (28) that Qt (p) - 0 for p     (p-, p* ).  Thus it follows from Picard- 
Lindelof 's theorem and the properties of (28) that a unique monotonic symmetric 
solution will exist for the price interval [p-, p]. We can repeat the argument for any 
p- (C t (0) , p) to show that a unique monotonic symmetric solution will exist for 
the price interval (C t (0) , p]. 
We now verify the global second order conditions.  To simplify notation let 
 
a(p, q)   - (p, q, wl ) + (p, q, w2 ) + (p, q, w3 ) , (67) 
[3(p, q)   - (  n - 1) (p, q, wl ) + (n - 1) (p, q, w2 ) + (n - 1) (p, q, w3 ) (68) 
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q 
 
We have from (26) that 
 
z (p, q) - (p - C t (q))[3(p, q)Qt (p) - qa(p, q) 
 
We also have C tt > 0 and Qt (p) > 0, so 
 
zq  ::; (p - C t (q))[3q Q
t - a - qaq 
 
Further, whenever z (p, q) - 0, we have 
 
qa[3q  - [3a - q[3aq zq  ::; [3 
 
We  know from (6) that  the  solution  is  an equilibrium  if z (p, q)  > 0 when  q ::; 
Q (p) and z (p, q)  ::; 0 when  q > Q (p).  This  follows  if zq (p, q)  ::; 0  whenever 
z (p, q) - 0. To verify this sufficiency condition, it suffices to show that 
 
[3(p, q)a(p, q) + q[3(p, q)aq (p, q) - qa(p, q)[3q (p, q) > 0 (69) 
To show this observe that the assumption 
nq  ji (cl , c2 )  ::; (3n - ) j (cl , c2 ) 
 
implies from (27) that 
 
 
nq q (p, q, wl ) - nq 
K 
 
-K q 
K 
 
j (q + Sl,-g (p) - t, S2 (p) + t) dt 
::; nq 
 
K 
j (q + Sl,-g (p) - t, S2 (p) + t) dt 
-K 
::; nq  jl (q + Sl,-g (p) - t, S2 (p) + t) dt 
-K 
K 
::;   (3n - ) j (q + Sl,-g (p) - t, S2 (p) + t) dt 
-K 
- (3n - ) (p, q, wl ) . 
 
Similarly   nq q (p, q, w3 )  ::; (3n - ) (p, q, w3 ) and  nq q (p, q, w2 )  ::; (3n - ) (p, q, w2 ). 
It follows from (67) and (68) that 
 
q[3(p, q)aq (p, q) - qa(p, q)[3q (p, q) 
- qn ( (p, q, wl ) (  q (p, q, w2 ) + q (p, q, w3 )) - qn  q (p, q, wl ) (   (p, q, w2 ) + (p, q, w3 ))) 
>  -(3n - ) (p, q, wl ) (   (p, q, w2 ) + (p, q, w3 )) 
 
It can be deduced from (67) and (68) that 
 
[3(p, q)a(p, q) > (3n - ) (p, q, wl ) (   (p, q, w2 ) + (p, q, w3 )) 
 
Thus (69) is satisfied, which is sufficient for an equilibrium. 
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Proof. (Proposition 3) It follows from the definitions of (p, q, wl ), (p, q, w2 ) 
and (p, q, w3 ) in (27) that under Assumption 1 we get 
 
 
 
(p, q, wl ) - 
K J 
j (q + Sl, 
-K 
 
-g (p) - t, S2 
K 
(p) + t) dt - 
J  dt  2K 
l l 
-K 
nq+K   
(p, q, w2 ) - 
JCXJ 
 
5  PJ+K 
j (q + Sl,-g (p) - K, c2 ) dc2 - 
J 
 
5  PJ+K 
dc5 
Vl 
nq-   5  PJ 
Vl 
 
(70) 
5  PJ-K 5  PJ-K 
 
 
 
Thus 
(p, q, w3 ) - 
J 
 
-CXJ 
j (q + Sl, -g (p) + K, c2 ) dc2 - 
J
 
-K 
 
 
(p, q, wl ) K 
dc5 
Vl 
   5  PJ 
Vl 
(w  p, q) - 
w (p, q, w) 
-    
nq +  K 
, (71) 
which gives (31).  For constant    , we note the similarities between (25) and the 
first-order condition for single-node networks with m symmetric firms [29]. 
Q - (p - C t (Q))Qt (m - 1) (72) 
By comparing (25) and (72) we can conclude  that  the  first-order  solution  of a 
firm in a symmetric two-node network with n firms per node is the same  as for 
a firm in an isolated node with inelastic demand and   n symmetric firms.  Thus 
analytical  solutions  to  (72) are  also  solutions  to  (25) when m - n.  For single 
node networks, we know that explicit solutions can be derived for symmetric firms 
facing an inelastic demand and that these solutions are monotonic [5][24][38], 
which gives us (32). 
 
Proof. (Proposition  4) Local net-imports must equal net-demand in every 
node, so r 
cl   
l
 
r 
Sl (pl ) 
l
 
r l r 
tl (  ) 
l 
   c2   - 
   S2 (p2 )    + 
  0   -1 0     t (  ) 
 
(73)    c3
    
S3 (p3 )  
 
 0 0   -1  
 
 2 t3 (  ) c4 S4 (p4 ) 
 
S  pJ 
 
,.. 
1 1 1    
,.. t 
   ,.. 
 
Thus 
 
 
 
 
 
and 
 
 
 
A-l  - 
r 
0   -1 0 
l
 
0 0   -1 
1 1 1 
 
r 
1 1 0 
l 
-l 
E - (A-l ) - 1 0   -1 
1 0 0 
(74) 
 
Each arc i has three congestion states.  In the uncongested state we have i - 0, 
i - 0 and ti (-K, K ).  When  the  arc is  congested  towards  node 4 we have 
ti  - K , i - 0, and i  > 0 and when the  arc is  congested  away from node  4 
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we have  ti  - -K ,    i  > 0, and   i - 0.  Altogether  there  are  3 x 3 x 3 - 7 
congestion states.  In Appendix C, we use (15) to calculate     (p, q, w) for one state 
w at a time.  The results are summarized in Table 1. Each competitor is assumed 
to submit a symmetric offer Q (p), so S2 (p) �  S3 (p) �  S (p) :- nQ (p) - D (p). 
Adding the results in Table 1 yields 
 
 
(p, q, w) - 
w 
6K S2 (p) 
V2 
16K 2 S (p) 
+ 
V2 
8K 3 
+ 
V2 
 
(75) 
 
Node 1 is  completely  integrated  with  either  node 2 or 3 in states  wl5 , wl7 , w26 , 
w27 and completely integrated with both nodes in state wl8 .  In the other states 
node 1 is  either  isolated  or only completely  integrated  with  node 4, which does 
not have any producers and where demand is inelastic.  We have 
 
(p, q, wl5 ) + (p, q, wl7 ) + (p, q, w26 ) + (p, q, w27 ) + (p, q, wl8 ) 
- 4K PJ
 4K 5 PJ-    PJJ 4K 5      PJ 4  K 5 PJ-    PJJ l6K 3 8K 5 PJ+l6K 3  
 
 
and 
V5 + V5 + V5 + V5 + V5 - V5 ,  
(76) 
 
(wl5  p, q) + (wl7  p, q) + (w26 p, q) + (w27 p, q) + (wl8  p, q) 
- P  P,q,wl1 J+P  P,q,wll J+P  P,q,w52 J+P  P,q,w5l J+2P  P,q,wl8 J
 4K     PJ+8K 5 (77) 
w P  P,q,wJ 
- 3  5  PJ+8K     PJ+4K 5 
 
This gives (41), because demand  is inelastic, so S (p) :- nq, and 
 
- 1 + (wl5  p, q) + (wl7  p, q) + (w26 p, q) + (w27 p, q) + (wl8  p, q) 
 
It follows from (14), (75) and (76) that 
 
z (p, q) - (p - C t (q))   St 
-q 2K
 
(p) 
2
 
6K   5  PJ 
V5 
l6K 5      PJ 
V5 
2
 
8K 5      PJ+l6K 3 
V5 S
t (p) 
V5   [3S (p) + 8K S (p) + 4K  ] 
 
We  note  that Z  P,qJ ::; 0, so if we find a monotonic  stationary  solution,  then  it 
is an equilibrium.  The two explicit equilibrium expressions and monotonicity of 
these solutions can be established as in the proof of Proposition 3. 
 
 
Appendix C1 Calculations for congestion states in 
star network 
 
In the  following we  use  AF (w), EF (w) and EF (w) to  denote  submatrices  of B  U L 
AB (w), EU  (w) and EL (w) corresponding to nodes in the set F (w). 
 
6.0.3 State wl  
State 
wl 
tl (w)   t2 (w)   t3 (w) 2 
K  K  K  {1} 
F 
{ , 3, 4} 
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State 
wl 
w2 
tl (w) 
K 
K 
t2 (w) 
K 
K 
t3 (w) 
K 
-K 
w3 
w4 
w5 
K 
K 
K 
K  (-K, 
-K -K 
-K (-K, 
 
w7 
w8 
-K 
-K 
K 
K 
w9 
wlO 
wll 
-K 
-K 
-K 
K 
-K 
-K 
wl2 -K (-K, 
wl3 
wl4 
(-K, K ) 
(-K, K ) 
K 
K 
wl5 (-K, K ) K 
wl6 (-K, K ) -K 
wl7 (-K, K ) -K 
 
w2O 
w2l 
K 
K 
(-K, K ) 
(-K, K ) 
K 
-K 
w22  -K -K K 
w23 
w24 
-K 
-K 
(-K, K ) 
(-K, K ) 
K 
-K 
w25  (-K, K ) -K K 
w26 (-K, K ) (-K, K ) K 
w27 (-K, K ) (-K, K ) -K 
 
V 
K PJ 5 
4K PJ 5 
K PJ-    PJJ 5 
4K PJ-   PJJ 5 
K   PJ  2    PJ-    PJJ 
2K     PJ PJ-    PJJ 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1  The 27 congestion states of the star network. 
 
(p, q, w) 
0 
0 
K (  5  PJ-   5  PJ) K ) 
 
 
K ) 
w6  K  (-K, K ) (-K, K ) 
 
V 
0 
K PJ-    PJJ5 
V 
8K 5 PJ-    PJJ 
V 
K  0 
-K 0 
K  5  PJ (-K, K ) V 
-K 0 
K   PJ  2    PJ-    PJJ (-K, K ) 
K ) (-K, K ) 
K 
-K 
(-K, K ) 
-K 
(-K, K ) 
 
V 
8K 5      PJ 
V 
2K   5  PJ 
V   
2K     PJ PJ-    PJJ 
V 
4K 5      PJ 
V 
2K PJ-    PJJ5 
V 
4K 5 PJ-    PJJ 
V 
wl8 (-K, K ) (-K, K ) (-K, K ) 8K 
wl9 K  -K K  0 
K (  5  PJ-   5  PJ) 
V 
 
V 
0 
V   V   
V 
 
V 
V 
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tF 
4 
AF U L 
tF 
4 
3 2 
3 
2 O 
- 
 
In this state we have from (73) and (74) that 
r 
1   -1 0  
l
 
AF F F
 
B  - 0   EU  - 
 
 
Thus it follows from (63) that 
1 0 -1 
1 0 0 
EL  - 0 
r 
St (p2 )   -St  (p2 ) 0 
l 
eF 2 2 JF (wl ) - - det St (p3 ) 0 -St  (p3 ) - 0, 
B wJ, pU wJ, uL wJ
 3 3 
St 4
 
4 (p ) 0 0 
 
because St (p4 ) - 0. Now, we have from (15) that 
 
(p, q, wl ) - 0 
 
 
6.0.4  State w2 
 
State   tl (w)   t2 (w)   t3 (w) 2  F 
w2  K  K  -K {1}   { , 3, 4} 
With similar calculations as for state wl , one gets 
 
(p, q, w2 ) - 0 
 
 
6.0.5  State w3 
 
State   tl (w)   t2 (w) t3 (w) 2  F 
w3  K  K  [-K, K ]   {1}   { , 3, 4} 
In this state we have from (73) and (74) that 
r 
0  
l
 
B  - -1 
1 
 
 
EF - 
r 
1   -1  
l
 
1 0 
1 0 
 
 
EF - 0 
 
Thus it follows from (63) that 
 
 
r 
0 St (p2 )   -St  (p2 ) 
l 
eF 2 2 JF(w3 ) - - det -1   St (p3 ) 0 - St (p3 ) St (p2 ) , 
B wJ, pU wJ, uL wJ
 3 3 2 
St 4
 
1 
 
because St (p4 ) - 0. Now, we have from (15) that 
4 (p ) 0 
 
(p, q, w3 )   - 
P-P P+ l K  
j (At + s (  (n, p, u))) St (p3 ) St (p2 ) dt3 d d  
 l O 
K 
 
 5    O 
P-P 
 
t3   -K 
 
 
P+ l 
3 2 2 l 
- St (p +  l ) V 
l 
St (p + 
5    O 
l - 2 ) d 2 d l 
K P-P 
- 
V2 l O 
 
St (p + 
 
l ) S2 (p + 
 
l ) d l 
K (S2 (p) S2 (p)) -  , 
V2 
where we have used that S2 (p) - S3 (p) - S(p) 
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6.0.6 State w4  
State 
w4 
tl (w)   t2 (w)   t3 (w) 2 
K  -K -K {1} 
F 
{ , 3, 4} 
 
AF U L 
tF 4 
4 
3 2 
O 
AF U L 
V 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With similar calculations as for state wl , one gets 
 
(p, q, w4 ) - 0 
 
 
6.0.7  State w5 
 
 
State   tl (w)   t2 (w) t3 (w) 2  F 
w5  K  -K [-K, K ]   {1}   { , 3, 4} 
In this state we have from (73) and (74) that 
r 
0  
l 
B  - -1 
1 
 
 
EF - 
r 
1 
l 
1 
1 
 
 
EF - 
r 
-1  
l 
0 
0 
 
Thus it follows from (63) that  
r 
0 St (p2 )   St (p2 ) 
l 
eF 2 2 JF(w5 ) - - det -1   St (p3 ) 0 - St (p2 ) St (p3 ) , 
B wJ, pU wJ, uL wJ 
3 
1 St 
2 3 
(p4 ) 0 
 
because St (p4 ) - 0. Now, we have from (15) that 
 
 
(p, q, w5 )   - 
 
P-P 
 
P-P-  l K 
 
 
j (At + s (  (n, p, u))) St (p2 ) St (p3 ) dt3 d  2 d  
l O  5    O 
K P-P 
 
t3   -K 
 
 
P-P-  l 
2 3 l 
- 
V2 l O 
K P-P 
St (p + l ) 
 5    O 
St (p + l +  2 ) d  2 d l 
- 
V2 l O 
St (p +  l ) [S2 (p) - S2 (p +  l )] d l 
K    P-P - 
r  
S (p) S (p +  l ) - S
2 (p +  l )
1
 
2 
2 
- 
K (S (p) - S (p))  
, 
V2 
 
where we have used that S2 (p) - S3 (p) - S(p) 
 
6.0.8 State w6  
State tl (w) t2 (w) t3 (w) 2 F 
w6  K  [-K, K ] [-K, K ]   {1}   { , 3, 4} 
In this state we have from (73) and (74) that 
r 
-1 0  
l 
B  - 0 -1 
1 1 
 
 
EF - 
r 
1 
l 
1 
1 
 
 
EF - 0 
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F 6 
2 
tF 
4 
AF U L 
tF 4 
- 
 
Thus it follows from (63) that 
 
 
J  (w ) - 
eF 
 
 
 
 
- det 
 
 
r 
-1 0 St (p2 ) 
l
 
0 -1   St (p3 ) 
 
 
 
 
- St (p2 )+St  (p3 ) , 
B wJ, pU wJ, uL wJ
 3 2 3 
1 St 4
 
1 4 (p ) 
 
because St (p4 ) - 0. Now, we have from (15) that 
 
 
(p, q, w6 )   - 
P-P K K 
j (At + s (  (n, p, u))) (St (p2 ) + St (p3 )) dt2 dt3 d  
l O 
4K 2 
 
t3   -K 
P-P 
 
t5   -K 
2 3 l 
- 
V2 l O 
St (p +  l ) d l 
8K 2 (S (p) S (p)) -  , 
V2 
 
where we have used that S2 (p) - S3 (p) - S(p) 
 
 
6.0.9  State w7 
 
State   tl (w)   t2 (w)   t3 (w) 2  F 
w7  -K K  K  {1}   { , 3, 4} 
With similar calculations as for state wl , one gets 
 
(p, q, w7 ) - 0 
 
 
6.0.10  State w8 
 
State   tl (w)   t2 (w)   t3 (w) 2  F 
w8  -K K  -K {1}   { , 3, 4} 
With similar calculations as for state wl , one gets 
 
(p, q, w8 ) - 0 
 
 
6.0.11  State w9 
 
State   tl (w)   t2 (w) t3 (w) 2  F 
w9  -K K  [-K, K ]   {1}   { , 3, 4} 
In this state we have from (73) and (74) that 
 r 
0  
l
 
B  - -1 
1 
 
 
EF - 
r 
-1  
l
 
0 
0 
 
 
EF - 
r 
1 
l
 
1 
1 
 
Thus it follows from (63) that   
r 
0 -St  (p2 )   -St  (p2 ) 
l 
eF 2 2 JF(w9 ) - - det -1 0 -St  (p3 ) - St (p3 ) St (p2 ) , 
B wJ, pU wJ, uL wJ 
3 3 2 
1 0 -St  (p4 ) 
where we have used that S2 (p) - S3 (p) - S(p) 
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4 
tF 
4 
- 
 
because St (p4 ) - 0. Now, we have from (15) that 
P 
(p, q, w9 )   - 
P-   l K  
j (At + s (  (n, p, u))) St (p3 ) St (p2 ) dt3 d d  l  
l O 5    O 
K P 
 
t3   -K 
 
 
P-   l 
3 2 2 
- 
V2 l O 
K P 
St (p - l ) St (p - l - 2 ) d 2 d  l 
5    O 
- 
V2 l O 
St (p - l ) S (p - l ) d  l 
K S2 (p) -  , 
V2 
where we have used that S2 (p) - S3 (p) - S(p) 
 
 
 
6.0.12  State wlO 
 
State   tl (w)   t2 (w)   t3 (w) 2  F 
wlO  -K -K -K {1}   { , 3, 4} 
With similar calculations as for state wl , one gets 
 
(p, q, wlO ) - 0 
 
6.0.13 State wll  
State tl (w)   t2 (w) t3 (w) 2 F 
wll -K -K [-K, K ]   {1}   { , 3, 4} 
In this state we have from (73) and (74) that 
r 
0  
l
 
AF F
 
r 
1   -1  
l
 
F 
B  - -1 
1 
EU  - 0   EL  - 1 0 
1 0 
 
Thus it follows from (63) that 
 
 
r 
0 -St  (p2 )   St (p2 ) 
l 
eF 2 2 JF(wll ) - - det -1   -St  (p3 ) 0 - St (p2 ) St (p3 ) , 
B wJ, pU wJ, uL wJ
 3 2 3 
-St 4
 
1 
 
because St (p4 ) - 0. Now, we have from (15) that 
4 (p ) 0 
P 
(p, q, wll )   - 
P-P+   l K  
j (At + s (  (n, p, u))) St (p2 ) St (p3 ) dt3 d  2 d  l  
l O 5    O 
K P 
 
t3   -K 
2 3 
 
P-P+   l 
- 
V2 l O 
K P 
St (p - l ) 
5    O 
St (p - l +  2 ) d  2 d  l 
- 
V2 l O 
St (p - l ) (S (p) - S (p - l )) d  l 
K (  S (p) S (p) S2 (p)) -  , 
V2 
where we have used that S2 (p) - S3 (p) - S(p) 
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F l2 
2 
tF 
4 
2 
tF 3 
 
6.0.14  State wl2 
 
State   tl (w) t2 (w) t3 (w) 2  F 
wl2 -K [-K, K ] [-K, K ]   {1}   { , 3, 4} 
In this state we have from (73) and (74) that 
r 
-1 0  
l
 
AF F
 
r 
-1  
l
 
F 
B  - 0 -1 
1 1 
EU  - 0   EL  - -1 
-1 
 
Thus it follows from (63) that 
 
J  (w  ) - 
eF 
 
 
 
 
- det 
 
 
r 
-1 0 St (p2 ) 
l
 
0 -1   St (p3 ) 
 
 
 
 
- St (p3 )+St  (p2 ) , 
B wJ, pU wJ, uL wJ
 3 3 2 
1 St 4
 
1 
 
because St (p4 ) - 0. Now, we have from (15) that 
4 (p ) 
P K 
(p, q, wl2 )   - 
K 
j (At + s (  (n, p, u))) (St (p3 ) + St (p2 )) dt3 dt2 d  l  
l O 
4K 2 
 
t5   -K 
P 
3 2 
t3   -K 
- 
V2 l O 
St (p - l ) d  l 
8K 2 S (p) -  , 
V2 
 
where we have used that S2 (p) - S3 (p) - S(p) 
 
 
6.0.15  State wl3 
 
State tl (w) t2 (w)   t3 (w) 2  F 
wl3 [-K, K ] K  K  {1, 4}   { , 3} 
In this state we have from (73) and (74) that 
 
AF F
 
r 
-1 0  
1 
F
 
B  - 0   EU  - 
 
Thus it follows from (63) that 
 
0 -1 EL  - 0 
 
 
JF(wl3 ) - 
eF - det 
r 
-St  (p2 ) 0 
1 
- St (p2 ) St (p3 ) 
B wJ, pU wJ, uL wJ 
 
Now, we have from (15) that 
0 -St  (p3 ) 2 3 
 
P 
(p, q, wl3 )   - 
 
P K 
j (At + s (  (n, p, u))) St (p2 ) St (p3 ) dtl d d  
5    O 3    O 
K P 
 
tl     -K 
P 
2 3 3 2 
- 
V2 5    O 
St (p - 2 ) d 2 St (p - 3 ) d 3 
3    O 
K S2 (p) 
- - 
V2 
K S2 (p) , 
V2 
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State tl (w) t2 (w) t3 (w) 2 F 
wl5 [-K, K ] K [-K, K ] {1, 3, 4} { 
 
2 
tF 3 
tF 
2 
 
6.0.16  State wl4 
 
State tl (w) t2 (w)   t3 (w) 2  F 
wl4 [-K, K ] K  -K {1, 4}   { , 3} 
In this state we have from (73) and (74) that 
r 
-1  
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
r  
0  
1 
AF F F
 
B  - 0   EU  - 0 
 
Thus it follows from (63) that 
EL  - -1 
 
 
JF(wl4 ) - 
eF - det 
r 
-St  (p2 ) 0 
1 
- St (p2 ) St (p3 ) 
B wJ, pU wJ, uL wJ 
 
Now, we have from (15) that 
0 St (p3 ) 2 3 
P 
(p, q, wl4 )   - 
P-P K  
j (At + s (  (n, p, u))) St (p2 ) St (p3 ) dtl d  3 d  
5    O 3    O 
K P 
 
tl     -K 
2 3 2 
 
P-P 
- 
V2 5    O 
St (p - 2 ) d 2 St (p +  3 ) d  3 
3    O 
- 
K S (p) (S (p) - S (p)) 
V2 
- 
K S (p) (S (p) - S (p)) 
, 
V2 
where we have used that S2 (p) - S3 (p) - S(p) 
 
 
6.0.17  State wl5 
 
 
} 
In this state we have from (73) and (74) that 
AF F F
 
B  - 0   EU  - [-1]   EL  - 0 
Thus it follows from (63) that 
 
 
JF(wl5 ) - 
eF - [-St  (p2 )]  - St (p2 ) 2 2 
B wJ, pU wJ, uL wJ 
 
Now, we have from (15) that 
 
(p, q, wl5 )   - 
K P 
 
t3   -K 5    O 
4K 2 P 
K 
 
tl     -K 
 
j (At + s (  (n, p, u))) St (p2 ) dtl d 
 
2 dt3 
- 
V2 5    O 
St (p - 2 ) d 2 
4K 2 S (p) -  , 
V2 
where we have used that S2 (p) - S3 (p) - S(p) 
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2 
tF 3 
 
6.0.18  State wl6 
 
State tl (w) t2 (w)   t3 (w) 2  F 
wl6 [-K, K ] -K -K {1, 4}   { , 3} 
In this state we have from (73) and (74) that 
r 
-1 0  
1 
AF F F
 
B  - 0   EU  - 0   EL  - 
 
Thus it follows from (63) that 
 
0 -1 
 
 
JF (wl6 ) - 
eF - det 
r 
St (p2 ) 0 
1 
- St (p2 ) St (p3 ) 
B wJ, pU wJ, uL wJ 
 
Now, we have from (15) that 
0 St (p3 ) 2 3 
 
(p, q, wl6 )   - 
P-P P-P K  
j (At + s (  (n, p, u))) St (p2 ) St (p3 ) dtl d  3 d  2  
5    O 3    O 
K P-P 
 
tl     -K 
2 3 
 
P-P 
- 
V2 5    O 
St (p +  2 ) d  2 
 
2 
St (p +  3 ) d  3 
3    O 
- 
K (S (p) - S (p))  
, 
V2 
where we have used that S2 (p) - S3 (p) - S(p) 
 
 
 
6.0.19  State wl7 
 
State tl (w) t2 (w) t3 (w) 2  F 
wl7 [-K, K ] -K [-K, K ]   {1, 3, 4}   { } 
In this state we have from (73) and (74) that 
AF F F
 
B  - 0   EU  - 0   EL  - [0] 
Thus it follows from (63) that 
 
 
and we have from (15) that 
JF(wl7 ) - 0 
 
 
(p, q, wl7 ) - 0 
 
6.0.20  State wl8 
 
State tl (w) t2 (w) t3 (w) 2 F 
wl8 [-K, K ] [-K, K ] [-K, K ]   {1,   , 3, 4} 0 
In this state we have from (73) and (74) that 
AF F F
 
 
 
Now, we have from (15) that 
B  - 0   EU  - 0   EL  - 0 
 
(p, q, wl8 ) - 
K 
 
t3   -K 
K 
 
t5   -K 
K 
 
tl     -K 
 
j (At + s (  (n, p, u))) dtl dt2 dt3 - 
 
8K 3 
V2 
